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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK GRAHAM, : 
Petitioner, : Case No. 2000 0042 
vs. : 
UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD, : Priority No. 14 
Respondent : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
MARK GRAHAM 
AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF 
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
_ _ (Case Below No. 9903004) ___ 
Appellant, Mark Graham by and through counsel of 
record, submits the following Brief of Appellant: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal of a final decision by 
the Utah Air Quality Board (hereinafter "Board"), 
1 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1) (1996), which 
grants the appellate courts jurisdiction to review all 
final agency actions resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a) (1996) (Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction over final orders resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Issue 
Did the Board erroneously deny Mr. Graham's 
Petition to Intervene when it determined that Mr. 
Graham's stake in the proceedings was insufficient to 
establish that his "legal interests may be 
substantially affected by the formal adjudicative 
proceeding"1 dealing with a regulated facility that 
routinely emits toxic doses of dioxin/furan in excess 
1
 Utah Code. Ann. § 63-46b-9(2)(a)(1996). 
2 
of its State permit, even though Mr. Graham lives 2 ^ 
miles from the facility? 
II. Statement of Grounds for Seeking Review 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9 mandates that 
intervention "shall" be granted in cases like that of 
Mr. Graham where affected citizens seek the opportunity 
to participate in agency adjudication and decision-
making. Since the Board nevertheless denied Mr. 
Graham's petition for intervention, Mr. Graham seeks 
judicial review of the Board's decision under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a). 
III. Standard of Review 
The standard of review of this issue is determined 
by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1996) . This provision 
instructs the appellate court to grant relief when a 
petitioner has been substantially prejudiced because an 
agency has "erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law'S Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)(1996), and/or an 
agency action is "an abuse of the discretion delegated 
to the agency by statute", Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
3 
16(4) (h) (i), or is "arbitrary or capricious". Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)(1996). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9 (1996): 
(l) Any person not a party may file a signed, written 
petition to intervene in a formal adjudicative 
proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to 
intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each 
party. The petition shall include: 
(a)the agency's file number or other reference 
number; 
(b)the name of the proceeding; 
(c)a statement of facts demonstrating that the 
petitioner's legal rights or interests are 
substantially affected by the formal 
adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner 
qualifies as an intervenor under any provision 
of law; and 
(d)a statement of the relief that the petitioner 
seeks from the agency. 
(2)The presiding officer shall grant a petition for 
intervention if he determines that: 
(a)the petitioner's legal interests may be 
substantially affected by the formal 
adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b)the interests of justice and the orderly and 
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings 
will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
4 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case turns on the issues of open government 
and the opportunity for citizens to influence agency 
decision-making. By denying Mr. Graham's petition to 
intervene in a permit violation proceeding, the Board 
effectively ruled out citizen intervention in any 
adjudication directly impacting air quality and the 
health and welfare of the public and the environment. 
In addressing this "confusing"2 and "difficult" issue, 
the Board fluctuates between applying the doctrines of 
intervention and standing to reach the merits of Mr. 
Graham's petition. Moreover, the Board incorrectly 
applied these doctrines, concluding that Mr. Graham's 
intervention was not proper despite his assertions 
that, among other things, he lives 2 4 miles from the 
facility and that he and the ecosystem of the Great 
Salt Lake are adversely affected by the facility's 
emissions in excess of its permit. 
5 
In light of Mr. Graham's showing of substantially 
affected legal interest, the effect of the Board's 
decision is to render meaningless the statutory 
intervention provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-46b--9. 
The Court now has the opportunity to reverse the 
Board's erroneous ruling, preserve the principle of 
intervention, and uphold the legislature's mandate that 
citizens be allowed to participate in agency 
adjudication and decision-making. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Dispositions Below 
On January 13, 2000, Mr. Graham filed his Petition 
for Review in this matter seeking review and overturn 
of the final order of respondent Utah Air Quality 
Board, entered December 21, 1999. In that order, the 
Board denied Mr. Graham's petition to intervene in the 
formal adjudicative proceeding before the board 
captioned "In the Matter of: Davis Country Solid Waste 
Management and Energy Recovery Special Service District 
2
 "Confusing" and "difficult" are the Board's terms for the 
intervention standard. Record at 11, pg. 2 & 10. 
6 
d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems (WES)(No. 99030004)" 
(hereafter "the WES matter"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Davis County Garbage Incinerator (d/b/a Wasatch 
Energy Systems, a/k/a Davis County Solid Waste 
Management and Energy Recovery Special Service 
District) (hereafter "Wasatch Energy Systems", or 
"WES") operates a municipal waste incinerator. The 
facility and its air emissions are permitted and 
regulated by the Utah Department of Environmental 
Quality, Division of Air Quality (hereafter "DAQ") 
pursuant to Approval Order Number DAQE-850-96 
(September 10, 1996). Wasatch Energy Systems has 
repeatedly violated this Approval Order. 
The State permit, issued in 1996, prohibits 
Wasatch Energy Systems from emitting more than 360 
ng/dscm of dioxins and furans into the air. 
Furthermore, the permit required the facility to test 
for compliance with this dioxin/furan limit in January 
or February of 1997. Initially, Wasatch Energy Systems 
failed to submit results of the February test which 
7 
showed emissions of dioxin/furan at 605.2 and 815,. 3 
ng/dscm for stacks A and B respectively. On June 25, 
1997, the Board issued a Notice of Violation (hereafter 
"June NOV") based on, inter alia, WES's failure to 
perform the February 1997 dioxin/furan stack test. 
WES appealed the June NOV on July 17, 1997, 
initiating a formal adjudication under Utah Admin. Code 
R307-102-3 (1) (b) . Subsequently, WES submitted a stack 
test conducted in October of 1997 which showed an 
impermissible dioxin/furan emission level of 379 
ng/dscm for stack B. . 
Immediately after DAQ issued the June NOV, Mr. 
Graham, along with some of his Layton neighbors, began 
to explore ways in which they could address the Board 
regarding the June NOV. In early 1998, the Board 
finally agreed to include, as part of a routine 
meeting, time for Mr. Graham and other residents to 
speak about the June NOV. At the last minute, the 
Board altered its agenda to exclude this participation. 
Still seeking the opportunity to influence the 
Board's resolution of the June NOV, Mr. Graham 
attempted to intervene in the relevant formal 
8 
adjudication, filing his Petition to Intervene in April 
1998. 
Rather than address Mr. Graham's petition to 
intervene, the Board voted on September 9, 1998 to 
settle the June NOV with WES pursuant to a Consent 
Decree. The Board never reached the merits of Mr. 
Graham's petition. The September 1998 consent order had 
no substantive provisions, included no fines, and 
ignored the October 1997 permit exceedance. Most 
importantly, the Board has failed to force the WES to 
comply with its permit, via the consent order or any 
other action. 
The very next stack test performed at the WES 
facility showed dioxin/furan emissions in violation of 
the permit. A stack test dated September 1998, showed 
emissions of 624 ng/dscm from stack A and 685 ng/dscm 
from stack B. In response to these impermissible levels 
of dioxin/furan emissions from the Wasatch Energy 
Systems, but with no apparent sense of urgency, the 
Board issued another Notice of Violation on July 9, 
1999 (hereafter "July NOV") based on the September 1998 
stack test. In addition to citing the stack test 
9 
violation, the Board again complained that the facility 
had not complied with the stack testing compliance 
demonstration requirement of the Approval Order. 
On July 30, 1999, Wasatch Energy Systems again 
filed an appeal of the NOV3, thereby requesting a 
formal proceeding before the Utah Air Quality Board for 
the purposes of determining the merits of the notice. 
Utah Admin. Code R307-102-3 (1) (b) (1999) ("Appeals 'of 
Notices of Violation and Orders shall be processed as 
formal proceedings'') . 
Experiencing deja vu all over again, Mark Graham 
filed a petition to intervene in this second formal 
proceeding on September 15, 1999 (In the Matter of: 
Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery 
Special Service District d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems 
(No. 99030004)), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
9(1996). Mr. Graham based his petition on, inter alia, 
the following: 
a. I live about 2 H miles from the Davis County 
Garbage Incinerator owned and operated by the 
Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy 
Recovery Special Service District, dba Wasatch 
3
 Request for Agency Action Vacating Notice of Violation and 
Order for Compliance, received August 2, 1999. 
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t? 
Energy Systems (Davis County Garbage Incinerator 
District). 
b. I am concerned about the effect of air emissions 
from the incinerator on the air quality and on my 
health. 
c. I grow vegetables (tomatoes, broccoli) and herbs 
in my backyard garden and herbs used for cooking 
(basil, peppermint, oregano, sage, thyme). I 
also have a bosc pear tree that produces pears 
which I eat. 
d. The air emissions from the Wasatch Energy Systems 
facility are carried by the wind in many 
directions, including to my house and garden, and 
to Layton and to the Great Salt Lake. 
e. I shop, and eat at restaurants, in Layton. 
f. I am concerned about enforcement of the Approval 
Order issued by State of Utah to the Davis County 
Garbage Incinerator District, especially the 
emission limits. I am concerned that lack of 
strict enforcement of the permit may jeopardize 
the air quality and my health. 
g. I feel the garbage incinerator facility and its 
air emissions threaten the Great Salt Lake. I 
love the Great Salt Lake, and I watch birds on 
the Lake, which is an important feeding ground 
for millions of migratory birds of many 
varieties. 
Record at 7. 
At a December 1, 1999, hearing and in an order 
dated December 21, 1999, the Utah Air Quality Board 
summarily denied Mr. Graham's petition to intervene 
"for the reasons on that day orally assigned." Record 
at 8. Essentially, the Board determined that Mr. Graham 
11 
did not demonstrate that he had a substantial legal 
interest in the outcome of the proceeding. _ld. The 
Board based its denial in part on an ill conceived 
notion that Mr. Graham must show that he suffered an 
"injury or damage specific to himself beyond that which 
would occur to the general public." Record at 11, pg. 
16. At the same time, the Board admitted that 
permitting Mr. Graham to intervene would not run afoul 
of the second part of the intervention inquiry - his 
participation would not materially impair efficiency or 
effectiveness of the proceeding. Record at 11, pg. 2 
(we "don't think the latter of that two-part 
[intervention] test is really much of an issue7') . 
Mr. Graham seeks immediate judicial review of the 
Board's inappropriate denial of his petition to 
intervene and refusal to allow him to participate in 
decisions affecting the quality of his environment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A petition for intervention "shall" be granted if 
two conditions are met. First, the petitioner's "legal 
interests" must "be substantially affected by the 
12 
formal adjudicative proceeding". Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-9. Second, allowing the intervention must not 
materially impair the interests of justice and the 
orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative 
proceedings. Id. Mr. Graham's petition for 
intervention satisfies both of these conditions. 
The Utah Air Quality Board improperly denied Mr. 
Graham the right to intervene in the administrative 
proceeding captioned "In the Matter of: Davis County 
Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special 
Service District d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems (No. 
99030004)" (hereafter "the WES matter"). Because he is 
subjected to WES's excessive and unlawful dioxin/furan 
emissions, Mr. Graham's legal interests are 
substantially affected by this formal adjudicative 
proceeding. Furthermore, allowing Mr. Graham to 
intervene will not materially impair the orderly and 
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceedings. Mr. 
Graham therefore should be allowed to intervene. 
Moreover, to the extent that the inquiry is 
instructive to a determination that Mr. Graham's 
interests qualify him to intervene, Mr. Graham also 
13 
satisfies the criteria to establish standing in this 
matter. Mr. Graham suffered distinct and palpable 
injury from the Board's failure to enforce its permit 
for the WES facility. With respect to resolving the 
unique issues he raises, Mr. Graham has the greatest 
interest of any party. Furthermore, the unique issues 
raised by Mr. Graham are of unique public importance. 
Mr. Graham therefore meets the conditions for having 
standing to participate in this matter. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD IMPROPERLY DENIED MR. 
GRAHAM THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE 
Mr. Graham is exactly the type of intervenor the 
legislature anticipated should be involved in the 
Board's formal adjudication. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
9(2) establishes that the presiding officer "shall" 
grant a petition for intervention if he or she 
determines that "the petitioner's legal interests may 
be substantially affected by the formal adjudicative 
proceeding" and "the interests of justice and the 
orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative 
proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing 
the intervention." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9(2). 
Since Mr. Graham's case satisfies both of these 
conditions, the Board should have allowed Mr. Graham to 
intervene. 
In its Order dated December 21, 1999, the Board 
stated that it 
finds and concludes that [Mr. Graham's] 
concerns, absent other claims or harms 
potentially requiring relief or redress for 
Mr. Graham specifically, do not constitute 
such "legal rights or interests" which "may be 
substantially affected" by the instant 
15 
proceedings as would allow intervention under 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9. 
Record at 9. 
For several reasons, the Board's reasoning is 
flawed. First, the Board did not apply the appropriate 
standard in making its determination to deny Mr. 
Graham's petition to intervene. As established above, 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act mandates 
intervention for any individual who has a substantial 
legal interest in the proceeding. Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-9(2). The standard says nothing about comparing 
these affected interests to the interests of anyone 
else and no such comparison is valid. An intervenor 
need not distinguish her or his interest from that of 
the general public. 
Second, even under the standards used by the 
Board, Mr. Graham qualifies for intervention - his 
interest in the matter is different and more 
substantially affected that the interest of the general 
public. As Mr. Graham made clear, he lives but 2 H 
miles from the facility and is understandably effected 
by WES's unlawful and excessive emissions of cancer-
causing dioxin/furans. 
16 
A. Mr. Graham's Legal Interests Are Substantially 
Affected by the Formal Adjudicative Proceeding 
Dioxin is incredibly harmful. A cancer 
epidemiologist at Boston University's School of Public 
Health has called dioxin "the Darth Vader of toxic 
chemicals'' due to its widespread harmful effects on 
many of the body's systems. Washington Post, May 17, 
at A01, Exhibit "A" attached. In its permit to WES 
facility, the state Division of Air Quality has 
promulgated maximum levels of dioxin/furan emissions. 
Notice of Violation and Order for Compliance, July 9, 
1999 at 1 2, Exhibit "C" attached. More recently, the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency 
reasserted and intensified its assessment of the 
serious health risks posed by dioxins and furans and 
the harm they pose. The EPA found the risk of 
developing cancer from dioxin "could be as high as 1 in 
100", placing the risk "10 times as high as the EPA's 
previous projections". Washington Post, May 17, at 
A01, Exhibit "A" attached. 
At issue in the formal adjudication before the 
board and in the previous proceeding in which Mr. 
17 
Graham tried to intervene were WES's violations if its 
permit and the responsive actions, if any, the state 
would take to protect public health and welfare. In 
any case, Mr. Graham is exposed to and affected by 
dioxin in unlawful quantities. Clearly, these 
emissions in levels in excess of the permit's 
requirements impact Mr. Graham. 
As stated in Mr. Graham's affidavit, he lives 2 % 
miles from the WES incinerator facility. Record at 7. 
He alleged, and the Board did not contest, that wind 
carries the airborne emissions from the incinerator in 
many directions, depositing them on Mr. Graham's house 
and garden, Layton, and the Great Salt Lake. _Id. Mr. 
Graham not only lives and breathes the air 2 ^  miles 
from the WES facility, but he also grows vegetables, 
fruit, and herbs in his backyard garden. Because these 
plant products grow under conditions of impermissibly 
high dioxin/furan levels, Mr. Graham is exposed to even 
higher levels of these carcinogenic chemicals by 
consuming the products of his garden. 
Mr. Graham also eats local food products such as milk 
and cheese produced commercially in the Layton area, 
18 
one of the most agriculturally productive areas of the 
state. Id. Consuming this food further concentrates 
the harmful carcinogens unlawfully emitted from the WES 
facility in Mr. Graham's body, directly harming him and 
greatly increasing his risk of cancer. Washington Post, 
May 17, at A01, Exhibit "A" attached. 
Furthermore, as stated in his affidavit, Mr. 
Graham watches and appreciates birds on the Great Salt 
Lake and its tributary streams, important feeding 
grounds and rest stops for millions of migratory and 
resident birds. Record at 7. The food eaten by these 
birds includes plants and fish, organisms that 
similarly develop under dangerously high levels of 
dioxins and furans. Through operation of the food 
consumer pyramid, this passes even higher 
concentrations of carcinogens on to upper-level 
consumer species. Such levels pose a serious harm to 
the birds whose presence and good health Mr. Graham 
values. 
Furthermore, in instructive federal cases, 
impermissibly excessive emissions by industrial 
combustion facilities such as incinerators and 
19 
refineries have been found to cause injury in fact to 
citizens living in their vicinities where they 
"impaired the quality of the air that plaintiffs 
breathed". Anderson v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 70 
F.Supp.2d 1218, 1222 (D.Kan. 1999). Federal courts 
have also held that exposure to unlawfully unclean air 
per se qualifies as injury. See, e.g., Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 
1974). In NRDC v. EPA, the court found injury to the 
plaintiff Abbuhl merely because he was a resident of 
the state for which the EPA approved an implementation 
plan: • "There is no doubt, however, that Dr. Abbuhl, as 
a resident of Arizona, will suffer injury if compelled 
to breathe air less pure than that mandated by the 
Clean Air Act." NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d at 910. -
Mr. Graham's claim of injury is even clearer than 
that in NRDC insofar as he lives only 2 ^  miles from 
the polluting facility. Similar to the injury suffered 
by Dr. Abbuhl, Mr. Graham is subject to WES's 
dioxin/furan excessive and unlawful emissions 
violations which impaired the quality of the air that 
20 
he breathes. Moreover, WESfs violations impaired the 
quality of the edible plants Mr. Graham grows. WES's 
emissions standards violations therefore clearly cause 
injury in fact to Mr. Graham. 
Furthermore, the legislature has determined that 
violation of a permit itself causes injury. The 
legislature has also determined that enforcement of 
permits is necessary to protect public health and the 
environment. As stated in the Air Conservation Act, 
[i]t is the policy of this state and the 
purpose of this chapter to achieve and 
maintain levels of air quality which will 
protect human health and safety, and to the 
greatest degree practicable, prevent injury to 
plant and animal life and property, [and] 
foster the comfort and convenience of the 
people. 
Utah Code § 19-2-101(2). One of the State's key tools 
for achieving this purpose is the enforcement of 
permits, such as the Approval Order for WES. E.g. Utah 
Code Ann. § 19-2-109. The seriousness with which the 
legislature takes permit violations is demonstrated by 
penalty provisions in the Air Conservation Act, which 
sets civil penalties of up to $50,000 per day for each 
violation and establishes criminal penalties for 
willful permit violations. See Utah Code § 19-2-115(2) 
21 
(establishing a $10,000 per day fine for permit 
violations); Utah Code § 19-2-115(5) (making a willful 
permit violation a misdemeanor). 
Finally, Mr. Graham's interest is substantially 
affected by the proceeding before the Board. If the 
Board allows WES to continue to release dioxin or fails 
to force WES to conform to the emissions limits 
contained in its permit, then Mr. Graham will continue 
to be harmed as detailed above. Even the Board's 
failure to attempt to deter WES from future emission 
violations will result in continued harm to Mr. Graham. 
Furthermore, if the Board had allowed Mr. Graham 
to intervene, the parties might have reached a more 
favorable result with respect to Mr. Graham's health 
and safety. For example, had the Board permitted Mr. 
Graham's participation, he might been able to persuade 
it to incorporate into the settlement his concerns, as 
shared by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency. Both Mr. Graham and the federal agency have 
serious objections to the resolution of the July NOV 
embodied in the settlement agreement. Letter from Ron 
Rutherford, Acting Director, Technical Enforcement, 
22 
Office of Enforcement, Compliance and Environmental 
Justice, US EPA, to Ursula Kramer, Executive Secretary, 
Utah Air Quality Board, March 3, 2000, Exhibit "D" 
attached. Based on the possibility of affecting the 
proceeding, Mr. Graham satisfies the prong of the 
statutory test for intervention contained in Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-9(2) that is before the court in this 
matter. 
B. Allowing the Intervention Will Not Materially 
Impair the Orderly and Prompt Conduct of the 
Adjudicative Proceedings 
Oddly, even though Mr. Graham satisfies both of 
the conditions for granting an intervention, the Board 
denied his petition. While the Board's Order seems to 
rely on the conclusion that Mr. Graham's legal rights 
are not substantially affected by the administrative 
proceeding, the Board's discussion also focused on 
concerns of setting a precedent of allowing 
interventions. Record at 11, pg 13. 
The Board's argument rejecting Mr. Graham's 
petition for intervention is unsound and - ironically -
leads to bad legal precedent the Board wished to avoid. 
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Following the Board's reasoning, if Mr. Graham is not 
allowed to intervene, then no one would be allowed to 
intervene. This would prevent any citizen, no matter 
how affected by permit violations, from fully 
participating in the formal adjudication affecting air 
quality. Such nihilistic logic destroys the very 
concept of intervention in such cases. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the folly 
of such a path: "To disallow intervention in this case 
would justify disallowing it in every case and render 
the intervention statute a nullity." Millard County v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 823 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 
1991). Similarly, denying Mr. Graham's petition for 
intervention would justify denying all petitions for 
intervention in every such case, thus eviscerating the 
statutory intervention provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-9. 
Intervention should not be denied on the grounds 
that many members of the public might qualify to 
intervene. Highly relevant to the present case is 
Millard County, 823 P.2d 459. In Millard County, the 
Tax Commission's order denying Millard County's 
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petition to intervene was reversed because the Tax 
Commission improperly denied Millard County's right to 
intervention. The Utah Supreme Court found that the 
County had met both the statute's and the Commission's 
requirements for intervention. Millard County at 463. 
The County sought intervention in a proceeding 
before the Commission to determine the tax liability of 
Intermountain Power Agency ("IPA"), a major taxpayer. 
In its denial of the County's petition for 
intervention, the Commission voiced concerns that 
allowing the County to intervene would extend the right 
to intervene to hundreds of other taxing districts. 
Because the Commission believed that allowing the 
County's intervention would "create an administrative 
nightmare, greatly increas[ing] the cost of 
administering the system," and "clog[ging] the entire 
system including the appeal and hearing system". 
Millard County at 4 62. The County concluded that the 
interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct 
of the proceedings would be impaired by intervention. 
The Millard County court found that the Commission's 
conclusion was not realistic. Millard County at 463. 
25 
In rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme Court 
notes that what matters to the intervention inquiry is 
that the County did have a protected legal interest in 
the matter: "Its participation in the proceedings may 
have resulted in a different, more favorable settlement 
of IPA's tax liability." Millard County at 463. 
Similarly, in the instant case, Mr. Graham's 
participation in the formal adjudication might have 
resulted in a more favorable settlement of the issue of 
WES's permit violations concerning public health. Mr. 
Graham therefore qualifies for intervention under the 
Millard County test. 
Even if it were relevant to the present inquiry, 
the suggestion that Mr. Graham's are common to the 
public at large is plainly wrong. Because Mr. Graham 
lives practically in the shadow of the WES facility, 
his interest in this matter is greater than that of his 
neighbors and other local residents of the Wasatch 
Front who live and work farther away from the facility. 
Furthermore, if Mr. Graham were just like everyone 
else, the holding in Millard County dictates that 
interveners must still be given the opportunity to 
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participate. In that case, the Court noted that while 
allowing intervention may complicate proceedings to a 
degree, the agency should devise procedures to minimize 
the burden without undermining the right of local 
entities to intervene where appropriate. Id. If 
intervention and full participation of numerous 
similarly situated entities would be unduly burdensome 
to the agency, the Commission should, for example, 
allow one local entity to act on behalf of other 
similarly situated entities. 
When there is an identity of interests among a 
number of taxing agencies, it is unlikely, in 
any event, that multiple interventions would 
be sought. Even if they were, the interests 
of the agencies can be adequately accommodated 
in most instances by a procedure that allows 
one party, or perhaps a few, to act on behalf 
of others. 
Millard County at 462. 
In cases like that of Mr. Graham, granting an 
intervention does not require the court to examine any 
issues extraneous to the initial inquiry; in fact, 
allowing the intervention gives the court access to a 
different perspective not originally included. In 
Millard County, the court noted that the tax assessment 
in dispute in that matter necessarily turned on facts 
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and legal issues that were identical with respect to 
the County and the Commission, and that therefore 
allowing the County to intervene would be proper. 
Similarly, in Mr. Graham's case, the permit violation 
in dispute necessarily turns on facts and legal issues 
that are identical with respect to Mr. Graham and the 
Board: namely, the harmful dioxin/furan emissions in 
violation of WES's permit. Because Mr. Graham thereby 
satisfies both of the statutory elements for 
intervention under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9, his 
petition to intervene should have been granted by the 
Board. 
II. MR. GRAHAM HAS STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS 
MATTER. 
While the proper standards for granting 
intervention are codified in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9, 
the Board seems also to have considered issues of 
standing. To the extent that the standards for 
standing are the proper criteria for granting an 
intervention, Mr. Graham also qualifies to have 
standing in this matter. Utah's doctrine of standing 
is intended to allow access to courts to redress injury 
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while ensuring the procedural integrity of judicial 
adjudications. This is achieved by requiring all 
parties to a lawsuit to have both sufficient interest 
in the subject matter of the dispute and sufficient 
adverseness that the disputed issues will be completely 
explored. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 
1983). See also Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands 
& Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986). This 
doctrine arises from the general principles of 
separation of powers established in Article V of the 
Utah Constitution. Id. The courts are therefore 
limited to resolving "crystallized disputes concerning 
specific factual situations." Id. at 799. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has referred to three 
general standards for determining whether a litigant 
has standing. See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150 (Utah 
1983). If any of these conditions are met, the 
litigant must be allowed access to the courts. Id. 
The first general criterion is that the plaintiff must 
demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that 
gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of 
the legal dispute." Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799 (quoting 
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Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150) . Second, if the 
plaintiff does not meet the first criterion, he or she 
has standing "if no one else has a greater interest in 
the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to 
be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has 
standing to raise the issue." Terracor, 716 P.2d at 
799. Third, a plaintiff who meets neither of the above 
criteria nonetheless has standing "if the issues are 
unique and of such great importance that they ought to 
be decided in furtherance of the public interest". Id. 
A* Mr. Graham Suffers Distinct and Palpable Injury 
From the Board's Failure to Enforce WES's Permit 
The first prong of the Jenkins standing inquiry 
requires distinct and palpable injury to the plaintiff 
as well as a causal relationship between that injury 
and the agency's actions. 
The first and most widely used standard to 
show standing requires a plaintiff to show 
some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the 
dispute... A mere allegation of adverse impact 
is not sufficient; there must also be some 
causal relationship between the injury to the 
plaintiff and the governmental actions. 
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Sierra Club v. Dept. of Env. Quality, 857 P.2d 
982, 986 (Utah App. 1993)(citing Jenkins at 1150). 
As detailed above, Mr. Graham's exposure to 
dioxin constitutes distinct and palpable injury 
giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of 
the WES matter. As stated in his affidavit, he 
lives but 2 H miles from the incinerator, and eats 
locally raised foods both from his garden and from 
local dairies and agricultural enterprises. 
Record at 7. Both WES's repeated permit 
violations and the very pollution itself cause Mr. 
Graham injury in fact. 
Furthermore, there is a causal relationship 
between the injury to Mr. Graham and the Board's 
actions. By refusing to enforce the terms of 
WES's State permit, the Board causes and allows 
the injury to Mr. Graham to continue. Mr. 
Graham's participation may influence the 
adjudication toward a more favorable resolution -
indeed, a resolution that reflects the serious 
concerns that he and the US EPA share regarding 
the settlement of the July NOV. Exhibit "D" 
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attached. Such a causal relationship satisfies the 
second requirement of the first Jenkins inquiry. 
B. Mr. Graham Has the Greatest Interest and Raises 
Unique Issues 
Even supposing Mr. Graham does not qualify for 
standing under the first test, he still qualifies under 
the two-part second Jenkins test. 
[I]f the aggrieved party does not have 
standing under the first part, a court may 
still grant standing if there is no other 
party who has a greater interest in the 
outcome of the case than the aggrieved party 
and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at 
all if standing is denied. 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. D.E.S., 878 P.2d 
1191, 1194 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Jenkins). 
The first element of this second Jenkins test is 
being the most appropriate plaintiff. In Jenkins, 
where Jenkins challenged the several educational and 
legislative systems within the state, he lacked 
standing because he did not live in any of the 
geographic areas whose systems he challenged: 
"Jenkins' interest is less direct than the interest of 
those living in the relevant school districts or 
legislative districts." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1151. 
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Mr. Graham's case differs markedly from that of Jenkins 
- Mr. Graham lives in the geographic area directly 
affected by WES's continued harmful and unlawful 
emissions. Applying the second Jenkins test to the 
facts of Mr. Graham's case, Mr. Graham raises issues 
relevant to a resident living near the incinerator 
which are different from the issues raised by the 
state. Mr. Graham therefore qualifies as the "most 
appropriate plaintiff" in this matter and therefore 
meets the first element of the second Jenkins test. 
In Sierra Club/ the court applied the second 
Jenkins test to a different set of facts. There, the 
Sierra Club sought to review a state agency's approval 
of a commercial hazardous waste incinerator project. 
Standing was not granted because the court found the 
environmental group not to be the most appropriate 
plaintiff. However, the court's reasoning in Sierra 
Club demonstrates that Mr. Graham is just the sort of 
plaintiff that is the most appropriate: 
Sierra Club is not the most appropriate 
plaintiff to challenge the Board's decision... 
[Appropriate plaintiffs with a greater 
interest in this dispute might include 
emergency response personnel, other persons 
working in the area of the proposed CIF, 
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owners of property near the site, or public or 
private entities located in proximity to the 
site. 
Sierra Club; 857 P.2d at 987 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Graham is easily distinguishable from the 
Sierra Club as a plaintiff. Unlike the Sierra Club, 
Mr. Graham owns property and resides 2 H miles from the 
incinerator site in this matter. He is among the 
entities highlighted in Sierra Club as appropriate 
plaintiffs. This clearly satisfies the proximity 
requirement embodied in the Sierra Club opinion. If 
Mr. Graham does not live sufficiently close to the 
incinerator site to qualify as the most appropriate 
plaintiff, then neither could practically any other 
person. He will provide to the adjudication the 
perspective of one who cares about air quality and its 
impact. Unlike the state, Mr. Graham need not balance 
issues of economics and with health-related concerns. 
These issues and this perspective will not be raised 
without his participation. Mr. Graham therefore 
satisfies the first element of the second Jenkins 
approach to standing. 
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Furthermore, for these reasons, the issues Mr. 
Graham seeks to raise are unlikely to be raised if Mr. 
Graham is denied standing. This is the second 
essential component of the second Jenkins test for 
standing: "Even if a plaintiff cannot show that it 
suffered some distinct injury, standing may still be 
established if no other plaintiff has a greater 
interest in the outcome and if the issue is unlikely to 
be raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing." 
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. See also Sierra Club, 857 
P.2d at 987 (following the Jenkins test). Mr. Graham 
should therefore be granted standing based on being the 
most appropriate plaintiff to represent his interests 
in this matter. 
C. Mr. Graham Raises Unique Issues of Great Public 
Importance 
Even if Mr. Graham does not qualify for standing 
under the first two Jenkins tests, he does qualify for 
standing under the third, "public importance" test. 
Under this approach, standing is granted where the 
plaintiff raises unique issues of great public 
importance. 
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In Sierra Club, the court considered this means of 
granting standing. "Sierra Club would nonetheless have 
standing if the issues presented are ^unique and of 
such great public importance that they ought to be 
decided in furtherance of the public interest'." 
Sierra Club, 857 P.2d at 987 (quoting Terracor v. Utah 
Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d at 799 ). See 
also National Parks and Conservation Association v. 
Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 
1993)(finding standing for an environmental group 
challenging transfer of state land within national park 
to county). However, in Sierra Club, where future 
public involvement was upcoming in the agency's own 
procedures, the court found that the issues raised were 
not of great public important and therefore declined to 
grant standing to the plaintiff. 
Sierra Club is challenging determinations by 
the Board that constitute internal procedural 
decisions preceding any public involvement in 
the permit process. The issues, at this 
stage, are not of great public importance and 
it is not in the public interest to seek 
review of the Board's internal operating 
procedures. 
Sierra Club, 857 P.2d at 987. 
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Mr. Graham, on the other hand, raises unique 
issues of public importance which the Board refuses to 
consider in a meaningful matter. No other party in the 
matter raises the unique issues of the harms to local 
residents caused by the WES incinerator's illegal and 
excessive emissions violations. The dramatically 
increased risk to the public of cancer and other 
disease posed by exposure to the impermissibly high 
levels of carcinogens emitted by the WES facility is 
certainly an issue of great public interest. The 
facility's unwillingness and/or inability to comply 
with its permit, and the State's response to this 
situation, are also matters of great public importance. 
Mr. Graham therefore qualifies under the third Jenkins 
test because he raises unique issues of great public 
importance. 
Thus, to the extent that the standing inquiry is 
instructive here, Mr. Graham qualifies for standing 
under any of the three Jenkins tests. This strongly 
suggests that Mr. Graham's petition for intervention in 
the administrative proceeding should be granted. 
37 
CONCLUSION 
By denying Mr. Graham the right to intervene in 
the WES matter, the Board violated its duty under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-9. In that provision, the 
legislature clearly envisioned that affected citizens 
like Mr. Graham would and should be allowed the 
opportunity to influence agency adjudication. Mr. 
Graham meets the legislature's criteria for 
intervention - his legal interests are substantially 
affected by the proceeding before the Board. His 
concerns about his own health and the well-being of the 
Great Salt Lake ecosystem entitle him to participate in 
the proceeding dealing with WES's unlawful emissions of 
toxic dioxins. Allowing the intervention will not 
materially impair the interests of justice and the 
orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative 
proceedings. Mr. Graham is concerned only with the 
issues before the Board - WES's permit violations and 
the State's response to those violations. Because Mr. 
Graham meets both of the statutory criteria for the 
mandatory granting of a petition for intervention, the 
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Utah Air Quality Board improperly denied Mr. Graham the 
right to intervene. The Board's decision to deny Mr. 
Graham's petition to intervene should be overturned, 
and Mr. Graham's petition should be granted. 
Furthermore, insofar as inquiry into standing is 
informative here, Mr. Graham qualifies to have standing 
to participate in the adjudicative proceeding 
concerning the WES incinerator facility's violations of 
its emissions standards. Mr. Graham suffers distinct 
and palpable injury from WES's permit violations, and 
should be involved in the Board's handling of those 
violations. If WES is sufficiently deterred from 
violating the appropriate dioxin/furan standards 
contained in the Approval Order, these harmful 
carcinogens will continue to harm and cause injury in 
fact to Mr. Graham. Mr. Graham's proximity to the 
facility gives him at least as great an interest in the 
proceeding as any other party. With respect to the 
particular and relevant issues that he raises, Mr. 
Graham has the greatest interest of any party in this 
matter. Finally, Mr. Graham raises unique issues of 
great public importance. While Mr. Graham is most 
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directly injured by the WES facility's unlawful permit 
violations because of his closeness to the incinerator, 
the polluting of the heavily populated Wasatch Front 
and the critical Great Salt Lake ecosystem with deadly 
carcinogens is certainly a matter of great public 
importance. The fact that Mr. Graham qualifies to have 
standing to participate in this matter further compels 
a finding of intervenor status. Because all factors 
indicate that Mr. Graham is entitled to intervene, the 
Board's decision to deny Mr. Graham's petition to 
intervene should be overturned, and Mr. Graham's 
petition should be granted. 
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th RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 17ca day of July, 
2000. 
JORO WW 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
MARK GRAHAM 
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The Utah Air Quality Board 
In the matter of 
Wasatch Energy Systems 
No. 99030004 
Petitioner Mark E. Graham submits this Petition to Intervene in the above matter pursuant to 
Utah Code 63-46b-9. 
Statement of facts demonstrating that the Petitioner's legal rights or interests are substantially 
affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor 
under any provision of law: 
In this matter the Utah Air Quality Board finds Wasatch Energy Systems (the Davis County 
Garbage Incinerator District, or the "District") in violation of the emission limits and compliance 
demonstration requirement stated as Conditions 7 and 8 of the Approval Order issued September 
10, 1996 to the source, and orders the source to "immediately initiate all actions necessary to 
achieve total compliance with all applicable provisions of the [Utah Air Conservation] Act." 
Further, the Board orders the source to "notify this office in writing on or before the 15th day of 
receipt of this letter of W.E.S.' intent to comply with this ORDER and indicate the date(s) on 
which W.E.S. will again perform stack testing at both the Unit A and the Unit B Discharge 
Points of the Bi-Flue Stack to demonstrate that compliance with the dioxin furan emission limit 
found in Condition 7 of the A.O. dated September 10,1996 has been achieved." (Notice of 
Violation and Order for Compliance, issued by Utah Air Quality Board Executive Secretary 
Ursula Trueman on July 9,1999, at 2) 
In a written reply dated July 16,1999 pursuant to the ORDER, the source failed to state its intent 
to comply with the order, failed to indicate what action, if any, it would take to achieve 
compliance with all applicable provisions of the Utah Air Conservation Act and the emission 
limits in its permit, and instead argued for the Board to accept a December, 1998 stack test and 
ignore and forget the September, 1998 stack test. 
In a written "Request for Agency Action Vacating Notice of Violation and Order for 
Compliance" dated July 30, 1999, the source disputes the validity of the September 15-17,1998 
stack test, which provided the evidence of violation used as the basis for the N.O.V.O.T.C., 
suggests a later (December, 1998) stack test which was not approved or accepted by the 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) ought to be accepted, disputes the legal authority 
of the Utah Air Quality Board to issue or enforce the Approval Order as written, and once again 
cites a disputed, industry-provided "health risk assessment", totally irrelevant to the Approval 
Order, as evidence of the safety of burning garbage in a residential area. 
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I Petition to Intervene 
Simply put, Petitioner has a legal right and interest, as do other local residents, in having the 
Utah Air Quality Board enforce the Approval Order and the emission limits and compliance 
demonstration requirement therein. It is a matter of air quality and public health. The 
Legislature passed the Act to protect air quality and public health. Title 19, Chapter 2, the Utah 
Air Conservation Act, established the Utah Air Quality Board and gave it the authority to issue 
permits with emission limits. The Utah Rules contain 4 separate categories of violations of 
varying severity and corresponding ranges of monetary penalties. Monetary penalties can have a 
deterrent effect on future air pollution. Furthermore, written and legally binding Orders from the 
Utah Air Quality Board have the force of law and can cause a source to take steps necessary to 
reduce air emissions to the environment. 
Also, the Approval Order from September 10, 1996 was issued pursuant to the Utah State 
Implementation Plan and therefore is enforceable under the federal Clean Air Act as amended. 
Petitioner has a legal right & interest in having the Clean Air Act enforced. 
Petitioner sought to intervene in a similar matter before pursuant to Utah Code 63-46b-9, namely 
Utah Air Quality Board v. Wasatch Energy Systems, which originated with a June 25, 1997 
Notice of Violation and Order for Compliance. Petitioner was never allowed to intervene in that 
matter, not because the Board chose to deny the Petition to Intervene which Petitioner submitted 
in about April, 1998, but because somebody at Air Quality either forgot or neglected to include 
Petitioner's written brief on his standing to intervene with the packet of information sent to 
Board members in July, 1998. That matter was settled before the Board ever addressed even 
allowing or not allowing that Petition. 
If the source's appeal / request for agency action is granted, it will have the following effects: 
1) Dioxin emissions in excess of the emission limit set in the Approval Order will continue, 
with the continuing long term negative consequences for air quality and public health. 
2) The Utah Air Conservation Act, the Approval Order, and Notice of Violation and Order for 
Compliance will not be enforced. Petitioner has a legal right and interest that all of the above 
should be and must be enforced. 
3) A precedent will be set for this source and others statewide that written Orders from the 
Board can be circumvented via sufficiently intense, spirited and aggressive legal posturing 
and maneuvering, once again thwarting the interests of the Utah Legislature in protecting air 
quality and public health. Other sources will be tempted to follow this course of action. 
Wasatch Energy Systems' consultant, Greg Rigo of Rigo & Rigo Associates, Inc. has submitted 
a report to the State dated January, 1999 on the expected relationship between dioxin/furan 
emissions and flue gas temperature as it enters the air pollution control system. This report 
provides the "scientific" basis for Wasatch Energy Systems' challenge and appeal and Request 
for Agency Action. However, Figures 7 and 8 in that report, on page 18, do not say what the 
District wants them to. The District implies there is an inverse relationship between dioxin/ftiran 
stack concentrations and flue gas inlet temperatures, but the data do not show this relationship to 
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be as strong as suggested, let alone strong enough to contradict the results of a properly and 
carefully performed stack test. Figure 7 shows dozens of data points, most of which are far from 
the line which has been drawn on the graph, supposedly as the best fit line. The standard 
deviation of this data set and this relationship is huge. The large number of data points lying a 
long way from the line proves that the supposed relationship does not exist or is not as reliable, 
pronounced, and distinct as the District claims. 
If the Board accepts this argument about dioxin/furan emission rates and flue gas temperature, 
and their relationship, and vacates the N.O.V.O.T.C. based on it, then the Board will have ceased 
to regulated dioxin/fiiran emissions directly, and will have begun to regulate dioxin/furan 
emissions by proxy only, the proxy being A.P.C.S. inlet temperature. This is contrary to the 
plain language of the Approval Order. Furthermore, such an interpretation amounts to a 
modification of the Approval Order, which cannot be stipulated by the Board. If the Board 
wishes to modify the Approval Order it must follow the formal procedures including public 
comment and hearing as specified in the Utah Air Conservation Act. 
Relief sought by Petitioner: 
1) Strict enforcement of the Utah Air Conservation Act, the Approval Order, and Notice of 
Violation and Order for Compliance, each and every one of them, including but not limited 
to: 
a) fines appropriate to the violation(s) 
b) a Written Order from the Utah Air Quality Board to the source to cause the source to take 
concrete action in terms of pollution control equipment or operational procedures or 
filtering out certain waste, or a combination of the above, in order to reduce dioxin 
emissions to below the permitted level 
c) a Written Declaratory Order from the Utah Air Quality Board on the accuracy, 
interpretation, and understanding of stack tests (air emissions tests) particularly Method 
23 and any other tests used for dioxin emissions, including grounds on which such a test 
can be challenged in the future 
d) A finding of whether, in light of the arguments raised by the source, there was a violation 
of either Condition 7 or Condition 8 of the Approval Order dated September 10,1996, in 
September, 1998, and the specific reasons why or why not in each case. 
e) A written resolution of the legal argument raised by the source based on the "more 
stringent rule" limitation on the power of the Board, found at page 6 of the source's 
Request for Agency Action. A written request to the Utah Attorney General to clarify the 
meaning and applicability of this provision. 
f) A written resolution of the supposed relationship between dioxin emission levels and 
temperature levels at garbage incinerators (municipal solid waste incinerators) of this 
type, which the source raised in is Request for Agency Action and in a separate report 
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submitted to the Board by Greg Rigo of Rigo & Rigo Associates, Inc. and how the Board 
uses that relationship, if at all, to assess apparent dioxin emission violations. 
g) A written clarification of the notice requirement, if any, applicable to "retests", and when 
a stack test is considered a "test" versus when it is considered a "retest". If notice 
requirements are different for "tests" and "retests", a statement of the logical, scientific, 
and regulatory basis for that difference. If the Board did not intend any meaningful 
difference between the terms "test" and "retest", a written statement clarifying the 
Board's intent. 
h) A written finding that the source has failed to state its intent to comply with the Order 
within the given time limit. 
* 
i) A written statement that neither the Division of Air Quality nor the Board has imposed a 
gag order on DAQ employees to prevent them from speaking to the media or the general 
public. The District is apparently under the impression that at one time such a gag order 
was imposed or promised or intended, and this misunderstanding has caused problems 
with some DAQ employees' communications with the media and the general public. 
j) A written statement from the Board that based on the professional opinions of the staff of 
the Division of Air Quality, and the "second opinion" provided by the Utah Division of 
Solid and Hazardous Waste, and given the lack of any statement from either the sampling 
company (Air Pollution Testing, Inc. of Wheat Ridge, CO) or the analytical company 
(Phillips Analytical Services of Ontario, Canada) that anything went wrong at any point 
in the stack test process, the evidence available proves there was a violation of the 
dioxin/furan emission limit in the September 15-17, 1998 stack test. 
2) such other relief as the Board may feel is appropriate. 
This source has succeeded in avoiding even one dollar of fines from the Board since early 1992. 
Yet the record shows this is not the result of clean and legal operations, but of repeated violations 
followed in every instance by aggressive, intense appeals, disputing, contesting, and fighting the 
permit. The Board should be aware that the District has a vested financial interest in doing so, 
and in causing the Board to back down not partially but totally, on this and future 
N.O. V.O.T.C.s. Such a vested financial interest arises from a promise which the District made to 
the Trustee representing the holders of its $28 million in bonds. The bond covenant includes the 
promise that following each fiscal year through 2006, the District will make a Written 
Certification to the Trustee that "the facility and the landfill were operated in compliance with all 
applicable federal, state and local rules, regulations, and laws " The ultimate threat to the 
District presented by this N.O.V.O.T.C. is that it will be unable to make that Written 
Certification in about August, 2000. The District may default, however technically, on its bond 
covenant and face a lower bond rating. Such a vested financial interest drives the District's 
intense opposition to enforcement of the Utah Air Conservation Act, the A.O., the N.O.V.O.T.C, 
and the emission limits therein, even in the face of clear evidence of a violation. 
e 
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Knowing that the Board was faced with a very similar enforcement action in 1997-98, and 
indeed some of the exact same issues (the "no stricter rule" for example) were raised by the 
District at the time, and knowing that despite written objections from about 3 dozen local citizens 
the Board approved a Stipulation and Consent Order on September 9,1998, which avoided and 
failed to resolve all of the major issues, and omitted any penalties, and failed to state whether 
there had even been a violation in February, April, or October, 1997, and knowing that the 
September, 1998 stack test revealed dioxin/furan emissions about 80% over the emission limits 
in the Approval Order, one can draw the obvious and correct conclusion. The Board has failed 
to enforce the Act and the A.O. in the past and has failed to require the District to reduce its 
dioxin emissions. 
A democracy works best, if at all, when the public interest is strongly and consistently put at the 
top of the agenda of all branches of government. Negotiations behind closed doors are 
inherently non-public, and leave a great opportunity for the public interest to either be of 
secondary importance or not important at all. The source has aggressively challenged 
enforcement actions such as this in the past (1997-98) and succeeded in undermining 
enforcement of the Act, the A.O., the N.O.V.O.T.C, and avoided having to reduce its air 
pollution. This is an unacceptable outcome of the regulatory process. Citizen input should be 
encouraged, and allowed in the form of this Petition to Intervene. 
Thank you. s\ 
Mark E. Graham 
Layton, Utah 
Davis County 
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Affidavit of Mark E. Graham 
1) I, Mark E. Graham, am at least 18 years of age. 
2) I live at 2211 East 1200 North, Layton, Utah 84040 
3) I live about 2 Vz miles from the Davis County Garbage Incinerator owned and operated by the 
Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special Service District, dba 
Wasatch Energy Systems (Davis County Garbage Incinerator District). 
4) I am concerned about the effect .of air emissions from the incinerator on the air quality and on 
my health. 
5) I grow vegetables (tomatoes, broccoli) and herbs in my backyard garden and herbs used for 
cooking (basil, peppermint, oregano, sage, thyme). I also have a bosc pear tree which 
produces pears which I eat. 
6) The air emissions from the garbage incinerator are carried by the wind in many directions, 
including to my house and garden, and to Layton and to the Great Salt Lake. 
7) I shop, and eat at restaurants, in Layton. 
8) I am concerned about enforcement of the Approval Order issued by State of Utah to the 
Davis County Garbage Incinerator District, especially the emission limits. I am concerned 
that lack of strict enforcement of the permit may jeopardize the air quality and my health. 
9) An employee of the Division of Air Quality has told me, 'The most important science in 
political science." Unfortunately, it seems (and I believe) that this statement accurately 
captures the state of the State's efforts, such as they are, to enforce the emission limits which 
it has set for this source. 
10) I feel the garbage incinerator facility and its air emissions threaten the Great Salt Lake. I 
love the Great Salt Lake, and I watch birds on the Lake, which is an important feeding 
ground for millions of migratory birds of many varieties. 
Signed, 
VMA QM^ C, iw 
Mark E. Graham date 
Mn teb4' ~t&2 j ^ 0 ^ Mm Amlkl 02JM^ 
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BEFORE THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY 
RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT d/b/a 
WASATCH ENERGY SYSTEMS 
No. 99030004 
ORDER 
This matter came before the Utah Air Quality Board ("Board") on December 1,1999 on 
Mark Graham's Petition to Intervene. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Wasatch Energy 
Systems, Fred Nelson represented the Executive Secretary and the Division of Air Quality, and 
Mark Graham appeared on his own behalf. A quorum of Board members was present and voted. 
The Board's consideration of the Petition to Intervene was conducted under the authority of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-9 (1953, as amended). 
The Board, having reviewed the record in this matter, and upon consideration of the 
pleadings and attachments, arguments of the parties and facts presented to the Board, voted to 
deny the Petition to Intervene, for the reasons on that day orally assigned. The Board hereby 
issues its written order as required by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-l etseq. 
The Board finds and concludes that Mr. Graham has failed to present evidence 
demonstrating that intervention is proper under the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9. 
Mr. Graham expressed in his petition, attachments and arguments to the Board his interest in 
seeing enforcement of the approval order and in prevention against environmental degradation 
generally. The Board finds and concludes that these concerns, absent other claims or harms 
potentially requiring relief or redress for Mr. Graham specifically, do not constitute such "legal 
rights or interests" which "may be substantially affected" by the instant proceedings as would 
allow intervention under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-9. Accordingly: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Petition to Intervene by Mark Graham is hereby denied. 
Dated this ^ / day of December, 1999. 
Utah Air Quality Board 
Notice of the Right to Apply for Reconsideration or Review 
Within 20 days after the date that a final order is signed in this matter by the Utah Air 
Quality Board, any party shall have the right to apply for reconsideration with the Board, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. The request for reconsideration should state the 
specific grounds upon which relief is requested and should be submitted in writing to the Board 
at 150 North 1950 West, P.O. Box 144820, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820. A copy of the , 
request must be mailed to each party by the person making the request. The filing of a request 
for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of an order. 
( 
A 
Notice of the Right to Petition for Judicial Review 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by the filing of a proper 
petition within thirty days after the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be MAILED a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER this Z P ^ d a y of December, 1999 to the following: 
Mark Graham 
2211 East 1200 North 
Layton, Utah 84040 
Larry S. Jenkins 
Richard Armstrong 
Wood Crapo, LLC. 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Fred G Nelson 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0873 
iLrLiL-IUfl?., 
1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE DECEMBER 1,1999 
2 UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD MEETING 
3 
4 PETITION TO INTERVENE BY MARK GRAHAM 
5 
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7 Richard Rathbun: Mr. Chairman, I'm Richard Rathbun with the Attorney General's Office and Fred 
8 asked me to represent the Board on this matter today and I will act as Board counsel. I've had the 
9 pleasure of doing so with the Solid and Hazardous Waste Board for several years, but I know it's been 
10 quite a few years since I've heard before the Air Quality Board, so it's a pleasure to be here. Basically, 
11 I'm here to act as Board counsel and answer your questions on this procedural issue which you have to 
12 decide today. But if I could take just a few minutes, I want to just give you an overview. 
13 As Mr. Nelson mentioned, what's before you basically is two items: One is the petition to intervene, the 
14 other is a scheduling matter—the schedule for discovery and the hearing and also the question of the 
15 appointing of the hearing officer. The more difficult one, I think, is the first though, and that is the 
16 petition to intervene. I'm sure you've seen the petition; it was filed by Mr. Graham and let me just 
17 mention as an aside, as Board counsel I try very hard to act strictly as a neutral advisor to the Board, not 
18 as an advocate for one side or the other on this decision, or on this point. So, please I want to just lay it 
19 out in as objective a manner as I can. Still, we get into some discussion of the facts in the law and so I 
20 will try to keep it brief, as brief as possible. But I want to give you a little outline of the issue. 
21 Basically, a petition to intervene is fairly common in litigation. It's also something that we have seen 
22 before in the administrative procedures setting. It asks that, in this case, a non-party to the formal 
23 proceeding which is before you be allowed to participate as a party. As Mr. Nelson mentioned, the 
24 Wasatch Energy Systems was issued an NOV by the Executive Secretary and exercised its right to appeal 
25 that and bring it before you for a formal hearing on that, something which this Board has seen and 
26 virtually all the environmental Boards have seen quite often. Where a non-party comes into the picture 
27 then is where Mr. Griffin who has an interest, I'm sorry, Mr. Graham, has an interest in this matter has 
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filed a petition asking to intervene. And what that means is if he's allowed to intervene, he will become 
party to the proceeding, he will be allowed to participate just as the other parties do, which means present 
evidence, call witnesses, present documentary or other evidence, cross examine witnesses, make 
arguments to the Board. And again, it's not that uncommon a proceeding, particularly in civil litigation. 
The standard that you need to apply, though, is addressed in the Utah Administrative Code, I'm sorry, in 
the Administrative Procedures Act, in Utah Code, section 63.46.B-9, which is entitled "Intervention." 
And it basically says that when someone wishes to intervene in an administrative proceeding, they 
should file a written application, which in this case Mr. Graham has done, and that the presiding officer 
shall grant the petition to intervene if you find that the petitioner's, or in this case Mr. Graham's, legal 
interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding and that neither the interest of justice nor the 
prompt conduct of the proceedings will be materially impaired. I don't think the latter of that two-part 
test is really much of an issue, but we'll address that in just a second. The real question then is whether 
Mr. Graham has expressed, in his petition and in the affidavit which was attached, a legal interest which 
is, or may be, substantially affected by these proceedings. It's there where we have very little guidance. 
I can tell you that there is a little bit of case law on this that is not defined in the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Best direction I can give you is a case law both in Utah and at the federal level on this 
basically says that someone who intervenes must show that they have a legal interest which is specific to 
himself, or to herself, as opposed to a general interest as a member of the public. Now in some extreme 
cases that can be described as a specific injury or specific damage that has been done, but it doesn't 
actually require a physical injury or damage, but still, a specific interest in the outcome of the hearing 
which will impact that person beyond, in a specific personal way, as opposed to just a general interest as 
a member of the public in seeing that the environmental laws are enforced. That's a difficult, I know and 
sometimes not real clear description of the dilemma that you're in and I hope to answer any other 
questions you may have when we get into the discussion, but I also in my role as Board counsel will 
1 defer to the parties after I have given you a little bit more of this. Perhaps we can hear from them and 
2 they can describe their view of this. In particular, Mr. Graham has expressed that in his petition and in 
3 his affidavit and he can further address that today as far as how his legal interests have been affected or 
4 may be affected. But that's what you have to decide and it's under the Administrative Procedures Act. 
5 Case law again, it kind of draws the line between a specific inquiry or a specific interest, not necessarily 
6 injury, of the plaintiff, or in this case the intervenor versus the vindication of just an undifferentiated 
7 public interest in seeing the laws applied. Your options of course are either to grant or deny, but as far as 
8 the consequences of that, let me try to give you just a little bit of a description of what I think the 
9 consequences could be. In granting intervention, you would allow Mr. Graham to join, as a party, again 
10 as I mentioned earlier, with all the rights to present evidence and examine, cross examine and the like. 
11 That in itself is not a negative at all on the proceedings, other than it may lengthen the proceeding 
12 slightly, but I don't think the Board would be very concerned with that. And just as an aside, I have 
13 found in litigation experience that sometimes two heads are better than one. When you have more 
14 parties sometimes they gather and address some things that I've forgotten, so that's not necessarily a bad 
15 thing. But it's just something to keep in mind. And in the larger context where someone is allowed to 
16 intervene, you also have the possible precedent setting, or precedential affect, of allowing a member of 
17 the public to intervene in one of these matters. Again, that's not a legal bar; you can still go ahead and 
18 do it, but just, I just hope you can make your decision knowing all the possible consequences. It's not a 
19 legal, it would not be a legally binding precedent in the sense that, by allowing Mr. Graham in, you're 
20 required to allow other interveners in the future, but just know you will hear the same arguments that 
21 you've heard from him in the future for intervention in matters where you may not think intervention is 
22 appropriate. So, just be aware of those possible consequences. There's also the possible consequence of 
23 granting the intervention, I guess, as a possible objection by the respondents, and again, you can hear 
24 from them directly, not from me, but I know that Wasatch Energy Systems potentially could complain of 
the intervention by way of seeking relief from the Court of Appeals. I don't know that they would do so, 
but I just want to mention that's a possibility. The flip side of that is if you deny the intervention, we go 
forward with the hearing with the parties who are already here, that is the Executive Secretary and the 
staff and Wasatch Energy. Mr. Graham, if he chose to, could seek relief from the Court of Appeals, the 
granting or denial of an intervention request is generally viewed as a final order which is appealable. So, 
if he wished, he could apply to the Utah Court of Appeals and make his case there that, you know, he had 
demonstrated a substantial legal interest and that because of that you should have allowed intervention. 
If the Court of Appeals agreed with him, they would most likely remand the case back to you for a 
hearing and have you hear it with Mr. Graham present. If, when that happens, you have not already 
heard the case, really there's not a whole lot of harm done, perhaps a little bit of dely, but otherwise no 
harm done. If you've already heard it, you would have to hear it again and just go through it again. But 
again, those are just the procedural consequences. And on the issue of procedural, let me just mention 
too that whatever your decision today, as Board counsel, I usually offer my assistance to the Board 
chairman in drafting an order, since the Administrative Procedures Act requires a written order on your 
decision, and I will do that, and I also urge you to express your opinions, your reasoning, and your, any 
findings that you wish to express today on the decision because those can be incorporated into the order. 
It's better for the process that people hear your reasoning and it's also frankly easier for me as your 
lawyer if it ever goes to an appeal to have your reasoning expressed on the record. And that's just 
something that we have had a little directive from the Court of Appeals over the course of many cases, 
not just in the environmental Boards, that the better expressed your reasoning the easier it is to review. 
That is usually included in the order, but also in the recorded discussion today. That's just sort of a quick 
overview. Again, I would defer to the parties themselves to really make their case to you because I 
wanted to just lay it out, I hope in neutral fashion, but I'm here to answer any questions as well. 
1 Howard Van Boerum: Okay. Who may we hear from today? We could hear from the petitioner, we 
2 could hear from Wasatch Energy, we could hear from the staff, we could hear from... 
3 Mr. Rathbun: I would suggest that you hear from all three if they wish, in whatever order, probably 
4 petitioner, since he is asking for the relief. 
5 Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. Mr. Graham would you like to take a few minutes? 
6 Mark Graham: Yes, please. Well, Mr. Chairman, members of the Board, I'm not gonna go over 
7 everything that I stated in the petition to intervene. It's hopefully self explanatory. I am glad that we've 
8 finally gotten to this point; it seems to have taken a while. I'm not an attorney, but I do have a little bit 
9 of experience in this. You probably remember that I attempted a petition to intervene in a very similar 
10 matter in 1998. We got to the issue of, as your counsel was just talking about, the question of does a 
11 person, do I under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, do I qualify. He mentioned two tests; he 
12 wasn't worried about the second one, but under the first test it's essentially a question of standing. And 
13 we got to that point, but of course the Board never heard it; never ruled on it. I did some research into 
14 that, both under case law at the state level, which is very limited, and there's case law at the federal level 
15 which is, there's lots of it. This is not the federal case, per se, this is not Clean Air Act; however, we all 
16 know that a lot of things that the Air Quality Board does are by way of implementing the Clean Air Act. 
17 My reading, and I'm not an attorney, of the case law that I was able to find says that general 
18 environmental degradation is sufficient injury for a person to have standing. So I would say that if 
19 you're going to rule on this you should have the benefit of... Yes, please. 
20 Richard Olson: Would you repeat that last statement again. I didn't get it. 
21 Mark Graham: There was a Supreme Court case, Morton, which goes back twenty-some years and that 
22 was really the first court case that attempted to define what would constitute standing for, in that case it 
23 was not an individual, but it was a citizens group, and they were alleging environmental harm and from 
24 reading that case, the Supreme Court said that general environmental degradation was sufficient injury 
that a person could have standing, you know, if a person was seeking to intervene, or I guess to sue 
maybe in that case, but in such a way as to prevent that injury. In other words, as I would look at this 
situation, we have a municipal waste incinerator located in a densely populated residential area. There 
are some 60,000 residents in Layton. I am not the nearest; I live approximately 2-1/2 miles away from 
the smoke stacks, from the plant. There are, there is Mountain View Elementary school 1-1/2 miles 
away. The nearest homes are approximately a quarter mile away. The thing about air pollution is that it 
affects everybody. Air pollution knows no boundaries. If the test is, "Am I the only person affected by 
the air pollution?," clearly I'm not and I don't think that's the test. It doesn't seem common sense to me. 
So, I would encourage the Board, if you're going to rule on this issue which, without having it being said 
by your counsel it's an issue of standing, I would encourage you to have the benefit of reading the case 
law that I have found at the federal level, which I believe supports, would support my standing. The 
other thing is that it's a public agency. I have made, well this is not my first effort, on a line of efforts 
that I have made in order to be able to communicate my views on this particular source, Wasatch Energy 
Systems, with the Board, I have found it difficult, and I believe that this is my last resort. I believe that 
the Administrative Procedures Act was set up specifically to give a mechanism for citizens who are 
interested in protecting the environment, such as myself, to have access to share my opinion with you 
prior to your ruling on this NOV and whatever resolution there may be. I think that if the Board is to 
deny this petition, it's the last, it's the avenue of last resort for the public to have input in the decision 
making process at this level. We can all speak to our legislators and 20 years ago or whatever when they 
passed the Air Conservation Act, that was the right time to do it. But at this level, at the administrative 
level, I believe that a petition to intervene is the avenue of last resort. I don't really have anything 
further to say on that. Further questions? 
Joseph Thompson: Does this case, this Morton case from a couple decades ago at the Supreme Court 
level, they're alleging environmental damage. I guess you had alleged that whatever violation they got 
1 an NOV for caused some environmental damage? 
2 Mr. Graham: Right. 
3 Mr. Thompson: Okay. So they'd be equal in that regard. The Attorney General's guy says that you 
4 would have to show injury specific to yourself beyond the general public, and I guess, you know, that's 
5 what DAQ is there for is to protect the general public. If you have some standing beyond that of the 
6 general public, that's what the Attorney General was, I think that's what he told us. You know, your 
7 petition, you know, says you live close by, fruit which you grow in your yard, you're concerned about 
8 important enforcement, you think that it impacts the Great Salt Lake and you like the birds there and 
9 what not. Those all seem to me to be things that (inaudible) the general public and your injury, you 
10 know, or your interest would have to be something, according to the Attorney General, specific to 
11 yourself that would impact you beyond that, that would impact the general public. So, I wanted to see 
12 what you think is different about you than the general public, for this injury. 
13 Mr. Graham: Okay. General public, and they all breathe the same air. I've made substantially more 
14 effort personally, individually, than the general public to, well to bring accountability, to the source and 
15 to have their emissions minimized. In that sense, I'm different from the general public. My neighbors to 
16 the left and my neighbors to the right arguably breathe virtually identically the same air. They don't take 
17 their time to express their opinions to the Air Quality Board; they're not making an effort to get involved 
18 in their government and improve the environment. I think your understanding of what your counsel said 
19 is, that's the same thing that I heard and understood, and I just, I think that's too limiting. I think that 
20 would exclude everybody. 
21 Mr. Thompson: If that's the test though. If that were the test, just for a thought experiment, if that's the 
22 test, the fact that you've been active in these matters wouldn't set you apart from the general public, it 
23 would say that you regard the injury more acutely maybe than your neighbor that doesn't come here. But 
24 I'm trying to, you know, if you appeal this, the Supreme Court, they're gonna be rubbin the same spot. I 
1 don't want to overdwell on it, but specific to yourself beyond that that it affects the general public, aside 
2 from coming here. 
3 Mr. Graham: Certainly, and I don't want to say anything that seems like I'm waiving my rights, but if 
4 that were the test, then certainly, I'm basically, in terms of the air I breathe and how it affects my body, 
5 J I'm not, you know, I don't have lung cancer or respiratory problems that would necessarily make me 
6 I more susceptible. 
7 Mr. Thompson: I don't know that you have to say it's injury or damage; it's your legal rights. 
8 Mr. Graham: That's what I was going to say. 
9 Mr. Thompson: It's not different than the general public. 
10 Mr. Graham: Well, no. If you read the Administrative Procedures Act, 46.B-9, as your counselor 
11 referred to, what that says is the petitioner demonstrates legal rights that would be substantially affected 
12 I by the proceeding. The test is not in there. The Administrative Procedures Act does not have this test 
13 that says I have to demonstrate, that I have to be different from Joe and Jane Public. The Administrative 
14 Procedures Act says that I demonstrated substantial, or legal rights and interests that could be 
15 I substantially affected by the proceeding, and I think I have. 
16 Mr. Olson: Mr. Graham, I'm a little bothered about, I've just been thinking in my mind, anybody can 
17 J appear before anybody and make any charge, we all know that. I guess it comes down to the facts of the 
18 matter and documentation and such. Now, it seems that, it seems in order to, in order to claim injury of 
19 some, in some way, there has to be documentation of injury, and, so I ask you, is there documentation. 
10 What is the injury and such to the environment, or whatever you claim? 
!1 Mr. Graham: It would be the, the documentation that I would rely on to answer your question is the 
2 exact same documentation that this Board relied on when it issued the Notice of Violation and Order for 
3 Compliance in July 9 of 1999, and that is exceedance of the source's emission limits for dioxins on both 
4 I of the stacks. I would rely on that exact same documentation. 
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1 Mr. Van Boerum: Do Board members have any questions of Mr. Graham, further explanations on his 
2 position? If not, thank you. 
3 Mr. Graham: Thank you Mr. Chairman. If counsel for Wasatch Energy Systems says something that I 
4 feel a need to reply to, will I be given the opportunity? 
5 Mr. Van Boerum: Sure. 
6 Mr. Graham: Thank you very much. 
7 Mr. Van Boerum: Does Wasatch Energy Systems wish to make a statement. 
8 Richard Armstrong: Yes, just briefly, if I might. My name is Richard Armstrong and I do represent 
9 Wasatch Energy Systems today, and I'm filling in for Mr. Jenkins. 
10 Mr. Thompson: Could I say at this point, Wood Crapo is the law firm, right? 
11 Mr. Armstrong: That's correct. 
12 Mr. Thompson: They represent Thiokol, and in fact, they are representing us on another matter. Sol 
13 just want that known. 
14 Mr. Armstrong: My comments are going to be very brief because, let me just preface my comments by 
15 stating that we really do not specifically oppose the petition that was filed in this case by Mr. Graham. 
16 But, I would like to reiterate what you pointed on, Mr. Thompson, and that is that Mr. Graham needs to 
17 show an injury specific to himself beyond simply an injury to the general public, and in his petition on 
18 page 2, at the top of the page, he indicates that he has a legal right and interest as do other residents. And 
19 then he states in the sentence after that that it is a matter of air quality and public health. I don't know if 
20 you can, if you see where I was reading there, at the top of page 2 of his petition. But I think those 
21 interests that he points to are really interests that belong to the public. In the Attorney General's Office, 
22 I'll let the Attorney General speak for the Attorney General's Office, but I think the representation there 
23 is adequate to represent the interests of Mr. Graham that's he's expressed in his petition and having said 
24 that, I'll turn the time over to Mr. Nelson, unless you have some questions for me. 
Mr. Van Boerum: Anyone have any questions for Mr. Armstrong? Fred. 
Fred Nelson: I just have a couple of comments on behalf of the staff. The staff has not filed an 
objection to the petition to intervene. We believe that the staff will adequately represent the interests 
presented by the Notice of Violation and on behalf of the public. There are a number of issues raised by 
Mr. Graham that we do not believe, as a staff, are relevant to the proceeding and we would, if he's 
granted the opportunity to intervene, we would make the appropriate objections to those issues at the 
time of the hearing. But at this point, we haven't filed an objection; it's just a matter the Board needs to 
consider if Mr. Graham is allowed to participate. We don't support that, but we don't oppose it either. 
It's a neutral position. 
Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. I'd like to hear another comment from Mr. Rathbun about the case law that 
was cited by Mr. Graham and your response to that. 
Mr. Rathbun: Thank you Mr. Chairman. The case law is voluminous at the federal level, as 
Mr. Graham mentioned. There's a lot of cases and it's been changing over the last, well I've practiced 
law 20 years now, it's been changing over the last 20 years. I don't think it's accurate to say that general 
environmental degradation is the test of a substantial legal interest. Quite clearly, under the various 
cases that have come down just in the last five years or so at the Supreme Court level, standing to 
challenge, or standing to enforce environmental laws, has been considerably narrowed. I didn't use the 
term "standing" because I didn't want to confuse the Board because it's often used in a confusing way. 
Let me just say that in this context, "standing" refers to the status of a person, or the position of a person, 
to actually come before you, and it's often been melded into the concept of whether that person has an 
injury which is, can be remedied in a court of law. So, if you have no injury and need no remedy, you 
really don't have a cause of action. That's a little different from the question of standing. The best 
example I can give you on standing is foreign corporations historically, in most states, if a corporation 
runs their trucks through the state of Utah, but has not registered to do business in the state of Utah, it's 
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1 an out-of-state corporation, it doesn't have offices here, but happens to run through the state in their 
2 truck, and has an accident and decides it wants to sue somebody, the courts have not allowed that 
3 because they've said you do not have legal standing to sue in the state because you have not followed 
4 (inaudible) to become an authorized corporation in the state of Utah. You may have an injury. You 
5 very well may have an injury because of that accident, but legally we do not recognize your right to step 
6 into the shoes of a litigate in our courts until you comply with the law and register with the registered 
7 agent and all those things. That's the simplest example of standing I can give you. As I said, it's often 
8 being confused with the concept of legal rights or remedies that may come along and courts, just like the 
9 rest of us, sometimes get confused and blend those two concepts together and so someone doesn't have 
10 injury, they say they don't have standing. That's the court's analysis, but that doesn't necessarily answer 
11 the question. But still, in that context at the federal level, the ability of a person to assert standing to 
12 appear in federal court and either claim the sort of a private attorney general right to enforce the law in a 
13 citizen suit context under the federal statutes or to actually seek injunctive relief for some kind of 
14 damages or other type of damages or an injury has been narrowed considerably and I can say I think with 
15 a great deal of confidence that the general test is, the test is not general environmental degradation, it is 
16 narrowed to a specific requirement that the party who wishes to intervene must show they've had a 
17 substantial legal interest that's been impacted, or may be impacted. It doesn't have to be an actual 
18 physical injury or monetary damages, it can be a legal right or legal interest, but it has to be specific to 
19 that person beyond those rights and interests which the man on the street has. We all have an interest in 
20 environmental enforcement. We all may have different views of it, but I think we all have a legal 
21 interest in seeing that environmental enforcement is brought about in an effective way. And if that is the 
22 test, than any person living in the state of Utah or at least in Davis County somewhere near this site could 
23 come in and ask to intervene and you will be asked then to possibly, I'm not sure that many people 
24 would be interested, but potentially, people, on that test, could be allowed to intervene because they want 
11 
1 to see the environmental laws enforced. The statutory scheme as it's set up as I see it with DEQ and the 
2 Executive Secretary and with some public participation built into the system doesn't contemplate, in my 
3 view, that sort of intervention en masse by people without a specific injury. Mr. Graham is right that 
4 under the Administrative Procedures Act all we have is the bare language of the Act; we don't have 
5 really a definition of substantial legal interest or right, but I can tell you too we have a little help from the 
6 Court of Appeals. Back in about 1992 or so, the Sierra Club was challenging the, some of the permit, the 
7 granting of the permit and some of the permit terms for the Clive incineration facility out in Tooele 
8 County. This was before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, and they were allowed to 
9 intervene on a very limited basis by stipulation of the parties. But when it got to the Court of Appeals, 
10 because they basically lost their challenge to the permit and the permit was issued, when they appealed to 
11 the Court of Appeals, they basically challenged that and the Court of Appeals addressed the standing 
12 issue and with language that was fairly strong actually, said that mere allegations, or at least allegations 
13 by members of the Sierra Club that their use and enjoyment of the western Utah, western Utah generally, 
14 and that their use would be adversely impacted by the Clive incineration facility failed to show any 
15 specific injury such as to grant standing or to allow intervention. They had been allowed to intervene by 
16 stipulation, but on the other issue beyond that, and that allowed them actually to intervene for very 
17 limited issues, not even for the entire matter. That's why the issue came up on appeal. So, it's not a 
18 binding decision necessarily, but I think you can get a sense of the way the Utah Court of Appeals has 
19 viewed it so far, that that language indicates they are very specifically following the trend in the federal 
20 law requiring a specific injury or interest, not a general interest common to the man on the street. I think 
21 that's the law and I think you need to obviously take that under serious consideration. I think on the 
22 merits of this, these things are never easy and if you allow Mr. Graham to participate, so be it. But keep 
23 in mind, however you're inclined to rule, the law indicates a requirement of a specific interest, not a 
24 general interest, and that's what you need to decide today-has he demonstrated that?. 
12 
1 Mr. Thompson: Would granting, if we said we think that Mark's arguments are compelling and that 
2 because he's interested in this we think he ought to have standing, is that somehow precedent setting? 
3 You said that we'd start hearing that back again. I don't want 90,000 people trooping through... 
4 Mr. Rathbun: It is, but let me not overstate that. It's not precedent setting in the sense of a legally 
5 binding decision. 
6 Mr. Thompson: But it would be an example. 
7 Mr. Rathbun: Right. So the next time if in another hearing someone wanted to intervene they couldn't 
8 say "You're bound by that decision." It would be a whole new case. You'd be entitled to make your 
9 decision again on the merits, but they would certainly use that decision as an example of why you should 
10 follow a similar decision. 
11 Mr. Thompson: What about the appeals court? Would the appeals court find some weight in granting 
12 Mark's standing here, I mean like later, another new case, unrelated. 
13 Mr. Rathbun: They might. I guess what you're asking is in another case if we allowed, or disallowed, 
14 some request to intervene and then they appeal to the Court of Appeals and argue well, they've allowed it 
15 before. Maybe. I think the Court of Appeals would still want to, clearly they are entitled to make a 
16 decision on the facts in the law, independent of the Board on a decision like that because it is a legal 
17 decision. Again, this is beyond the scope of really what we want to talk about today. I have practiced 
18 law 20 years and I still don't always understand...factual decisions versus legal, but clearly on that it's a 
19 legal decision the Court of Appeals would decide. I don't think they would really care that much, but 
20 certainly the argument would be made that the Board allowed it, why not again. It would not be binding 
21 on the Court of Appeals; they hear it. 
22 Mr. Thompson: It's not binding on the Board either. 
23 Mr. Rathbun: Right. It's not. 
24 Mr. Van Boerum: Probably our discussions ought to focus on the facts that are available, the law that's 
13 
1 available, the arguments that have been given and not on any supposition of what might or might not 
2 happen in later situations. Does the Board wish to hear from any other parties involved in this? I think 
3 we've given each party ample opportunity to express their position. 
4 Mr. Thompson: Mark might want to rebut that or talk again. 
5 Mr. Graham: There are a couple of things. I read that court case, 1992 Utah Court of Appeals, and it 
6 was fresh in my mind right about the time of July of 1998 when Wasatch Energy Systems had submitted 
7 a legal filing to this Board that claimed I did not have standing. It's not nearly as fresh in my mind at 
8 this point, and I really think that there are some differences between that case and this. One of the things 
9 that that court said was that you cannot stipulate standing, which apparently had been done. The court 
10 said that I just don't buy that you can stipulate standing in the first place. It was a little different in, as a 
11 blur, there are many processes and many steps in many processes that you take and you can make a 
12 decision and then somebody can appeal your decision and at this point you're not, the only thing the 
13 Board has done with this source is issued a Notice of Violation and Order for Compliance. It's a little bit 
14 different, you're at a little bit different step in a process, and I believe you're in a little bit different 
15 process than was contemplated in that case. I would really appreciate and request the right to be able to 
16 review that case and tell you what I think it says and what I think it does not say before you're going to 
17 make this decision. If I'd known that I should be prepared and fluent in that case today, believe me I 
18 would have been. I didn't. As long as we're talking about federal law, the Clean Air Act section 7604 is 
19 the provision for citizen suits, and it spells out the rights of a citizen to do two things: one is to sue either 
20 a source or the Environmental Protection Agency and another one is to intervene. I'm going to focus on 
21 the provision of the Clean Air Act that talks about intervention, and I remember this verbatim because 
22 the language is so absolutely clear. First, it says, it defines the circumstances and the steps that a person 
23 has to take in order to sue under the Clean Air Act section 7604, and then it says in any such case, and I 
24 quote, "Any person may intervene as a matter of right," end quote. That's the federal law. I think that's 
14 
1 crystal clear. If we're talking about federal law, I think that's perfect guidance. Regarding the fact that 
2 Mr. Nelson mentioned that are some issues that I have raised in my petition that he and the staff feel are 
3 not totally relevant, the Board could, of course, grant the petition to intervene, but exclude certain items. 
4 You can say, okay Mark, we're just not going to talk about the following, a, b, c and d. And that 
5 problem would be taken care of. Another thing I remember from case law is the concept of creating a 
6 private attorney general. This is a term that's come down in federal case law. The citizen suit provision 
7 was put into the United States Clean Air Act because Congress saw the need for creating a mechanism 
8 for people to get involved, and this is what they called private attorneys general. Basically it would be 
9 because there could be circumstances where either the regulatory agency is stretched too thin to devote 
10 sufficient resources to a source, or in some rare cases, there's conflict of interest and the agency simply 
11 is more sympathetic to the source than to the public. But it could be for either one of those reasons that 
12 Congress created the citizen suit provision and to encode into law, to codify, the private attorneys general 
13 concept and I think that the Attorney General, the one we have in Utah, doesn't need a personal injury, so 
14 would a private attorney general need to have, to demonstrate personal injury? I don't think so. 
15 Speaking of injury and back to that Utah Court of Appeals case from 1992, members of the Sierra Club 
16 in that case alleged future, their use and enjoyment of the west desert would be jeopardized if a 
17 hazardous waste incinerator facility was going to be permitted. It think it's a little, when dioxins go into 
18 the air and that's the reason this Board sent the Notice of Violation out, it's a specific thing, it's 
19 emissions of dioxins into the air and dioxins, they're bad for you. You can ask your toxicologist and 
20 your scientists how bad dioxins are for you, but I think it's a more of a real thing than the fact that I can't 
21 enjoy the west desert as much. Anyway, and the last point I want to make is if you're afraid that you will 
22 have dozens, or hundreds, or possibly thousands of citizens of the state of Utah attempting to intervene in 
23 every matter that comes your way, I would want to reassure you that I don't think that's going to happen. 
24 Right now you're looking at one person, and that's me. I think the citizens of this state do care about 
15 
1 clean air, but I don't think you're gonna have just a parade of all kinds of people into that door to this 
2 room petitioning to intervene. I simply don't believe that that would happen. And I thank you for your 
3 time. Does anybody else have another question? 
4 Mr. Van Boerum: Does the Board have questions? Mr. Rathbun, do you have any final comments? 
5 Mr. Rathbun: No, I don't believe so. I'd be glad to answer any other questions. 
6 Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. I think the Board has been sufficiently briefed and has heard both sides of the 
7 argument, has been briefed by our attorney. Guess you've taken notes as I have on what he has said 
8 relative to the law, so I'd entertain a motion by a member of the Board to either grant or deny the petition 
9 to intervene. 
10 Mr. Thompson: I'd make a motion to not grant petition to intervene based on the requirement for him 
11 to show an injury or damage specific to himself beyond that which would occur to the general public. 
12 Mr. Olson: I'd second that motion with this statement that as well intended as Mr. Graham's petition to 
13 intervene may be, I only have legal counsel to direct my thoughts for the most part, but it seems to me 
14 like it does fall short in meeting his obligation to show cause of impact or injury. So, I'll second the 
15 motion. 
16 Mr. Van Boerum: We have a motion and a second. Do we have any comments from the Board on the 
17 motion. Call for the question? 
18 Board Member: I'll call the question. 
19 Mr. Van Boerum: Okay. All in favor? 
20 Board Members: Aye 
21 Mr. Van Boerum: Opposed? 
22 Dannie McConkie: I'd like to abstain. 
23 Mr. Van Boerum: That's been abstained. Okay. The petition to intervene has been denied by 
24 unanimous vote of the Board. Thank you all. 
16 
Mr. Nelson: Mr. Chairman, may I raise an issue? 
Mr. Van Boerum: Yes. 
Mr. Nelson: And that is because there are seven members of the Board and we have one abstaining, I 
think the Chairman needs to vote because you have to have six votes. 
Mr. Van Boerum: All in favor? 
Board Members: Aye 
Mr. Van Boerum: Opposed? Okay, it still passes. Thank you. 
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EPA Links Dioxin To Cancer 
By Cindy Skrzycki andJoby Warrick 
Washington Post Staff Writers 
Wednesday, May 17, 2000; Page A01 
~ ? E-Mail This Article 
WJA Printer-Friendiv Version 
The Clinton administration is preparing to dramatically raise its estimate 
of health threats from dioxin, citing new evidence of cancer risk from 
exposure to the toxic chemical compound. 
A draft of a long-awaited report by the Environmental Protection Agency 
concludes for the first time that dioxin is a "human carcinogen." The 
report notes that emissions of dioxin have plummeted from their peak 
levels in the 1970s but still may pose a significant cancer threat to some 
people who ingest the chemical through foods in a normal diet. 
Dioxin comes from both natural and industrial sources, such as medical 
and municipal waste incineration and paper-pulp production. The 
chemical enters the food chain when animals eat contaminated plants. 
Dioxin then accumulates in the fat of mammals and fish. It has been 
linked to several cancers in humans, including lymphomas and lung 
cancer. 
For a small segment of the population who eat large amounts of fatty 
foods, such as meats and dairy products that are relatively high in 
dioxins, the odds of developing cancer could be as high as 1 in 100, the 
report says. That estimate places the risk 10 times as high as the EPAs 
previous projections. 
Exposure to dioxin occurs over a lifetime, and the danger is cumulative, 
the report said. Studies have found that people all over the globe have 
some dioxin in their bodies. 
The report, obtained by The Washington Post, links low-grade exposure 
to dioxin to a wide array of other health problems, including changes in 
hormone levels as well as developmental defects in babies and children. 
It also concludes that children's dioxin intake is proportionally much 
higher than adults' because of the presence of the chemical in dairy 
products and even breast milk. 
"It's the Darth Vader of toxic chemicals because it affects so many 
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Mmmg&mm systems [of the body]," said Richard Clapp, a cancer epidemiologist at 
8»<uMwcA.gqM Boston University's School of Public Health. "The amounts, are coming 
down, but even small amounts are harmful." 
The EPA's draft assessment, if finalized in its current form, would solidify 
dioxin's status as one of the most potent chemical toxins known to 
science. 
Although the risk from dioxin varies widely—and may be nearly zero for 
many people-the findings suggest that dioxin already contributes to a 
significant number of cancer deaths each year. Environmentalists, 
extrapolating from the EPA's risk findings, have estimated that about 100 
of the roughly 1,400 cancer deaths occurring daily in the United States 
are attributable to dioxin. 
Officials predicted yesterday that the report would stimulate many 
questions about the safety of the food supply. Administration officials 
said, however, that the higher dioxin risks should not discourage people 
from eating nutritious foods and following dietary guidelines emphasizing 
low-fat foods. The report stressed that mothers should continue to 
breast-feed because the benefits far outweigh the risk of dioxin exposure. 
In an indication of the potentially far-reaching implications of the report, 
the White House has intervened in an unusual way to coordinate its 
release. The report is scheduled to be released in June and will be 
evaluated by scientific reviewers. 
It's not clear that the findings will lead to new regulations on dioxin 
emissions, but EPA briefing papers discussed several strategies for 
reducing human exposure to the chemical, including better monitoring. 
The findings came as a surprise even to EPA policymakers who have 
tracked slowly falling levels of dioxin in the environment—the result of a 
series of tough new regulations on dioxin-emitting industries. 
The EPA said industrial emissions of dioxins have been reduced some 80 
percent between 1987 and 1995. 
"We're heading in the right direction because we're seeing dioxin levels 
decrease," said one administration official who spoke on the condition of 
anonymity. But while dioxin levels in the population are declining, "our 
ability to understand the risk has improved," the official said. 
Dioxin came to public attention as the contaminant in Agent Orange, a 
controversial herbicide used by U.S. forces in Vietnam. In 1983, the EPA 
forced the evacuation and demolition of the entire town of Times Beach, 
Mo., after the discovery of dioxin contamination on city streets. 
Industry scientists have long accused the EPA of overstating the threat 
from dioxin, and many believed the agency's review would result in a 
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downgrading of the official risk estimate. 
C.T. Kip Howlett, vice president and executive director of the Chlorine 
Chemistry Council, said the EPA has a conservative view of the health 
risks of dioxin and they are "out of sync" with the rest of the world's view 
on safe levels of the chemical. 
Howlett said the agency "has a real problem on it's hands" in expressing 
apocalyptic concern about dioxin, while also stressing that the food 
supply is safe, breast feeding is the right thing to do and regulatory 
initiatives are working. 
"There are a lot of things in this report that are counterintuitive to what 
the facts are," Howlett said. 
Keith Holman, chief regulator/ counsel of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, said no industry wants to produce dioxin—which is an 
unintended by-product of combustion—"but let's make sure we have 
sound science before we regulate down to a zero level where it's clearly 
not warranted." 
Environmentalists supported'the EPA's findings but raised concerns that 
the agency would use falling dioxin levels as an excuse to delay any 
further tightening of regulations to control dioxins. 
"They seem to be taking a triage approach, not worrying about emissions 
but dietary exposures of human beings," said Rick Hind of Greenpeace 
International's toxics program. "That suggests they can't walk and chew 
gun at the same time." 
The agency's understanding of dioxin has improved since the agency 
began in-depth studies in 1991, and this installment is particularly 
important because it includes results of landmark human epidemiological 
studies from Europe and the United States. 
In a briefing to EPA managers on May 10, the agency said it expected 
"many stakeholders to take dramatic action when the draft reassessment 
is released," and pressure from other interests given the "extraordinary" 
findings of the reassessment. 
For the first time, the agency's draft report classifies the most potent form 
of dioxin-2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD)--as a "human 
carcinogen," a step above the previous ranking of "probable carcinogen." 
More than 100 other dioxin-like compounds were classified as "likely" 
human carcinogens. 
Over the past five years, the EPA has imposed regulations on major 
dioxin emitters, including municipal waste combustors, medical waste 
incinerators, hazardous waste incinerators, cement kilns that burn 
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hazardous waste, pulp and paper operations, and sources of PCBs. 
When those regulations become fully effective over the next few years, 
the agency expects further declines of dioxin levels. 
"We still have a certain amount of dioxin circulating in the environment. 
We need to focus on the idea of reducing exposure and not simply going 
after all sources to the environment," said one administration official. 
One source likely to be targeted is uncontrolled residential waste burning, 
such as burning trash in back yards, particularly in rural areas, EPA 
briefing papers said. Such burning is "one of the largest unaddressed 
dioxin sources and one that could have a disproportionally large 
contribution to the food supply." 
The agency also is discussing the possible regulation of other sources 
such as sludge disposal from privately owned waste-treatment facilities 
and the regulation of other air sources of pollution. 
Sources said that there have been lengthy discussions at the EPA on how 
to release the report and answer questions stemming from it. 
Several federal agencies have been involved in the preparation of the 
report and are expected to participate in the review of it. Agencies such 
as the Agriculture Department and the Food and Drug Administration, as 
well as the Food Safety Council, are readying their own responses to 
questions about the safety of the food supply, advice on following the 
dietary guidelines and breast feeding. 
"People were not expecting this was an issue they had to deal with," an 
administration official said. "Over the last eight years there have been 
regulations that have already cut dioxin emissions from the most likely 
sources." 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY 
150 North 1950 West 
P.O. Box 144820 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4820 
(801) 536-4000 Voice 
(801) 536-4099 Fax 
(801) 536^414 T.D.D. 
DAQC-846-97 
LeGrand Bitter 
Davis County Energy Recovery Facility 
650 East Highway 193 
Layton, Utah 84041-8647 
Dear Mr. Bitter: 
Re: DAVIS COUNTY ENERGY RECOVERY FACILITY - NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR 
COMPLIANCE - Conditions 7 and 8 of Approval Order (AO) DAQE-850-96 Dated September 10, 1996-
Davis County 
On June 9,1997, an inspector representing the Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Quality Board performed a review 
of the results of stack testing performed on the Davis County Energy Recovery Facility Incinerator in February and April, 
1997 located at 650 East Highway 193, Davis County. As a result of the stack test review, it was determined that Davis 
County Energy Recovery Facility was in violation of Conditions 7 and 8 of the AO dated September 10, 1996. 
The enclosed NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE is based on the findings documented 
by the inspector. Please be advised that compliance with this ORDER is mandatory and will not relieve the company 
of liability for any past violations. 
Written notification of Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's intent to comply, outlining how compliance is to be 
achieved, must be submitted to the Division of Air Quality within 15 days of the receipt of this notice. A meeting will 
then be arranged to discuss the violation, findings, and resolution. Questions regarding this matter may be directed to 
Anthony DeArcos at (801) 536-4028. 
Sincerely, 
Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary 
Utah Air Quality Board 
UKT:AD:tj 
Enclosure: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE 
cc: Department of Environmental Quality, Dianne R. Nielson 
EPA Region VIII. Lee Hanley 
Davis County Health Department 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Dianne R. Nielson, Ph.D. 
Executive Director 
Ursula K. Trueman 
Director 
Certified Mail 
June 25, 1997 
ooOoo 
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
: NOTICE OF VIOLATION 
I n t h e M a t t e r of : AND ORDER FOR 
D a v i s C o u n t y E n e r g y : COMPLIANCE 
R e c o v e r y F a c i l i t y : No . 97060024 
ooOoo 
This NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE is issued by the UTAH AIR QUALITY 
BOARD (the Board) pursuant to the Utah Air Conservation Act (Act) Section 19-2-101, 
et sea. , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The Executive Secretary is 
authorized to issue Notices of Violation pursuant to Section 19-2-110 of Utah Code 
Annotated. The Board has delegated to the Executive Secretary authority to issue 
ORDERS in accordance with Section 19-2-107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
FINDINGS 
1. Davis County Energy Facility operates a waste incinerator at 650 East Highway 
193, in Davis County, Utah. 
2. On September 10, 1996, the Executive Secretary issued an Approval Order (AO) 
to Davis County Energy Recovery Facility in accordance with Utah 
Administrative Code (UAC) R307-1-3.1. 
A. Condition 7 of the AO states, in part: 
"Emissions to the atmosphere from each discharge point of the bi-flue 
stack shall not exceed the following rates and concentrations..." 
HC1 (Hydrogen Chloride): 330 ppmdv @ 7% 02. 
B.' Condition 8 of the AO states, in part: 
* Initial compliance testing shall be done for all contaminants 
specified in this approval order for both incinerators during 
January/February 1997.. . The Executive Secretary is fully aware that 
performing the requisite tests may prove impossible during very cold 
weather due to procedural difficulties and will allow rescheduling 
testing to more clement weather should the ambient temperature be below 
20 degrees F at the start of the scheduled test..." 
On February 5-8, 1997, and April 17, 1997, Air Pollution Testing, Inc. 
conducted stack tests at Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's Incinerator 
Stacks A and B. Stack test results were to be submitted to the Division of 
Air Quality (DAQ) 3 0 days after the stack tests were performed. Stack test 
results for both test dates were submitted on May 30, 1997. 
On June 9, 1997, a representative of the Executive Secretary (inspector) 
performed a review of the Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's stack test 
report results submitted to the DAQ by Air Pollution Testing, Inc. As part 
of the review, the inspector found that results were 339.3 ppmdv @ 7% 02 for 
Hcl (Hydrogen Chloride) on Stack A for the February 5-8, 1997, stack test and 
350 ppmdv @ 7% 02 for HC1 ( Hydrogen Chloride), on Stack A for the April 17, 
1997, stack test. 
On June 9, 1997, the inspector also found in reviewing the stack test report 
thai the Davis County Energy Recovery Facility did not complete testing for 
Dioxins/Furans during the February 5-3, 1997, stack tests. Data from -the 
National Weather Service shows that the ambient temperature was.not below 
20 degrees F. during the time of testing as Davis County Energy Recovery 
Facility claims in the stack test report. 
VIOLATIONS 
1.' Based on the foregoing FINDINGS, Davis County Energy Recovery Facility is in 
violation of UAC R307-1-3.1 and the AO dated September 10, 1996, Condition 
7, for exceeding the emissions limit for Stack A. 
2. Based of the foregoing FINDINGS, Davis County Energy Recovery Facility is in 
violation of UAC R307-1-3.1 and the AO dated September 10, 1996, Condition 
8,. for failing to perform a stack test for Dioxins/Furans in January/February 
1997. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS AND VIOLATIONS, Davis County Energy Recovery 
Facility, pursuant to Section 19-2-107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated, is hereby 
ORDERED TO: 
1. Immediately initiate all actions necessary to achieve total compliance 
with ail applicable provisions of the Act. 
2. Notify this office in writing on or before the 15th day of receipt of 
this letter, of Davis County Energy Recovery Facility's intent to 
comply with this ORDER and indicate how compliance is to be achieved. 
COMPLIANCE, QPP9RTVNTTY FQR A HgARtNC 
This ORDER is effective immediately and shall become final unless Davis County 
Energy Recovery Facility within thirty (30) days pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
19-2-110. Section 19-2-115 of the*Utah Code Annotated provides that violators of 
the Utah Air Conservation Act and/or any ORDER issued thereunder may be subject to 
a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 per day for each violation. 
^ Dated ,T/CJ? day of VU/np^ , 1997. 
Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary 
Utah Air Quality Board 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Dianne R. Nielson. Ph.D. 
Executive Director 
Ursula K. Trueman. P.E. 
Director 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY c 
150 North 1950 West 
P.O. Box 144820 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-4820 
(801)536-4000 Voice 
(801) 536-4099 Fax 
(801) 536-4414 T.D.D. 
July 9, 1999 
Mr. LeGrand Bitter 
Wasatch Energy Systems 
650 East Highway 193 
Layton, Utah 84041-8647 
Dear Mr. Bitter: 
JUL 2 3 *" 
DAQC-330-99 
RE: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER TO COMPLY - Utah Administrative Code (UAC) 
R307-401 and Conditions 7 and 8 of Approval Order (AO) dated September 10, 1996 - Wasatch 
Energy Systems - Davis County 
On January 15, 1999, the Division of Air Quality received a report dated January 12, 1999, of compliance 
testing performed at the Unit A Discharge Point and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack on 
September 15, 1998, through September 17, 1998. The report data indicate that at the time of testing, 
dioxin/furan emissions from the Unit A Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 624 nanograms per dry 
standard cubic meter corrected to seven percent oxygen (ng/dscm @7% 02), and that dioxin/furan emissions 
from the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 685 ng/dscm @ 1% 02. These are violations 
of Condition 7 of the AO dated September 10, 1996, which limits dioxin/furan emissions from each point of 
the Bi-Flue Stack to 360 ng/dscm @ 1% O,. 
In February, 1999, the Division of Air Quality received a report dated February 3, 1999, of compliance testing 
performed at the Unit A Discharge Point and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack commencing 
on December%199& DAQ was not notified of the testing as required by Condition 8 of the AO and the tests 
were not conducted for Dioxin/Furan using an arithmetic average of three 4-hour minimum stack test runs as 
required by Condition 7 of the AO. Therefore, the December testing does not constitute a compliance 
demonstration as required by Condition 8 of the AO. 
The enclosed NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER TO COMPLY is based on the data contained in 
the stack test report. The ORDER is effective immediately. Compliance with the ORDER is mandatory and 
will not relieve the company of liability for any past violations. To request a formal administrative hearing, 
the procedures detailed in the paragraph entitled "Compliance, Opportunity for a Hearing" must be followed. 
E x h i b i t C 
DAQC-330-99 
July 9, 1999 
Page 2 
The ORDER requires Wasatch Energy Systems to submit written notification of its intent to comply, including 
the date(s) when stack testing will again be performed to demonstrate that compliance with the dioxin/furan 
emission lim:.t has been achieved at both the Unit A and Unit B Discharge Points, to the Division of Air 
Quality within 15 calendar days of receiving the ORDER. A meeting will then be arranged to discuss the 
violations, findings, and resolution. Questions regarding this matter may be directed to Harold Burge at 
(801)536-4129. 
WHEN RESPONDING, DO NOT REFER TO DAQC#, REFER TO THE DATE ON THIS LETTER. 
Sincerely, 
Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary 
Utah Air Quality Board 
UKT:HAB:vmn 
Enclosure: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER FOR COMPLIANCE 
cc: Dianne R. Nielson. Executive Director Department of Environmental Quality 
Carol Smith, EPA Region VIII 
Davis County Health Department 
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
00O00 
In the Matter of 
Wasatch Energy Systems 
(WES) 
NOTICE OF VIOLATION 
AND ORDER FOR 
COMPLIANCE 
No.99030004 
00O00 
This NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ORDER ?<SR COMPLIANCE is issued by the UTAH AIR QUALITY 
BOARD (the Board) pursuant to the Utah Air Conservation Act (Act) Section 19-2-101, 
et sea., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The Executive Secretary is 
authorized to issue Notices of Violation pursuant to Section 19-2-110 of Utah Code 
Annotated. The Board has delegated to the Executive Secretary authority to issue 
ORDERS in accordance with Section 19-2-107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
FINDINGS 
1. WES operates two municipal waste combustor units (Units A and B) located at 
650 East Highway 193, Layton, Davis County, Utah. WES7 offices are located 
at that same address. 
2. On September 10, 1996, the Executive Secretary issued an Approval Order (AO) 
to WES in accordance with Utah Administrative Code (UAC) R307-401. Condition 
7 of that AO limits dioxin/furan emissions from each discharge point of the 
3i-Flue Stack to 3 60 nanograms per dry standard cubic meter corrected to seven 
percent oxygen (ng/dscm £ 7% 0:) . Condition 8 of the AO requires annual stack 
tests for a compliance demonstration. 
3. On January 15, 1999, the Executive Secretary received a report dated January 
12, 1999, of compliance testing performed at the Unit A Discharge Point of the 
3i-Flue Stack and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack on September 
15, 1998, through September 17, 1998. The report data indicate the following: 
A. At the time of testing, dioxin/furan emissions from the Unit A Discharge 
Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 624 ng/dscm @ 7% 0.. 
3. At the time of testing, dioxin/furan emissions from the Unit B Discharge 
Point of the Bi-Flue Stack averaged 685 ng/dscm § 7% 0-. 
4. In February, 1999, the Division of Air Quality received a report dated 
February 3, 1999, of compliance testing performed at the Unit A Discharge 
Point and the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue Stack commencing on 
December 1, 1998. DAQ was not notified of the testing as required by 
Condition 8 of the AO and the tests were not conducted for Dioxin/Furan using 
an arithmetic average of three 4-hour minimum stack test runs as required by 
Condition 7 of the AO. 
VIOLATIONS 
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS, WES is in violation of the following: 
A. Condition 7 of the AO dated September 10, 1996, for exceedance of the 
dioxin/furan emission limit at the Unit A Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue 
Stack. 
3. Condition 7 of the AO dated September 10, 1996, for exceedance of the 
dioxin/furan emission limit at the Unit B Discharge Point of the Bi-Flue 
Stack. 
C. Condition 8 of the AO for failing to conduct testing which constitutes 
an annual compliance demonstration. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS AND VIOLATIONS, WES, pursuant to Section 19-2-
107(2) (g) of the Utah Code Annotated, is hereby ORDERED TO: 
1, Immediately initiate all actions necessary to achieve total compliance 
with all applicable provisions of the Act. 
2. Notify this office in writing on or before the 15th day of receipt of 
this letter, of WES' intent to comply with this ORDER and indicate the 
date(s) on which WES will again perform stack testing at both the Unit 
A and Unit B Discharge Points of the Bi-Flue Stack to demonstrate that 
compliance with the dioxin/furan emission limit found in Condition 7 of 
the AO dated September 10, 1996, has been achieved. 
COMPLIANCE. OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING 
This ORDER is effective immediately and shall become final unless Wasatch Energy 
Systems requests, in writing, a hearing within thirty (30) days of receipt of this 
Notice pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 19-2-110. Section 19-2-115 of the Utah Code 
Annotated provides that violators of the Utah Air Conservation Act and/or any ORDER 
issued thereunder may be subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 per day for 
each violation. 
3A Dated JTK day of At^^^ , 1999. 
Ursula K. Trueman, Executive Secretary 
Utah Air Quality Board 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
REGION VIII 
938 18th STREET - SUITE 500 
DENVER, COLORADO 80202-2466 
8ENF-T MAR 3 2000 
Ms. Ursula Kramer. 
Executive Secretary, . 
Utah Air Quality Board 
P.O. Box 144820 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 84114^820 
Re: High Priority Violations at Wasatch Energy Systems 
Dear Ms. Kramer: 
This letter is to inform you of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency's concern with the operations of the Davis County incinerator and the proposed 
settlement between the State of Utah and Wasatch Energy Systems (W.E.S.). As you 
are aware, the U.S. Environmental'Protection Agency (EPA) has been closely following 
the operations of this municipal waste incinerator. According to information provided 
by your staff, emissions from the incinerator have historically exceeded emission limits 
for a variety of pollutants. EPA is particularly concerned with the exceedances of the 
dioxin/furan limit. W.E.S. is a current High Priority Violator based on violation of the 
State permit limit for dioxins/furans as demonstrated by Reference Method testing on 
September 17, 1998. Recent test results show one of the units emitting 1100 ng/dcsm 
of dioxins/furan, more than three times the emission limit. 
We understand that the Utah Division of Air Quality issued a Notice of Violation 
and Compliance Order for the September 1998 violations and is planning to issue a 
second NOV for the recent violations. We are also aware that W.E.S. has twice 
previously been listed as a Significant Violator and yet was not assessed an 
appropriate penalty by the State for these violations. 
As you have discussed with Martin Hestrn r^k, there are a number of compelling 
issues of concern at W.E.S., including a history of noncompliance, a lack of 
cooperation in remedying the violations, a potential conflict of interest in that a member 
of the Air Quality board holds a position with W.E.S., numerous citizen complaints 
including a pending citizen's suit, and possible public health concerns regarding the 
dioxin/furan emissions. EPA believes that W.E.S. is not currently in compliance with 
emission limits based on Reference Method Testing. EPA would appreciate being 
informed of the results from the December 1999 Reference Method testing once the 
results are received by the State, 
We understand that the State is preparing *o enter into a settlement with W.E.S. 
that requires only the early installation of air pollution controls that will be required by 
the proposed New Source Performance Standards, While this action will clearly benefit 
the environment, EPA views it as insufficient to resolve W.E.S.' past and current 
violations. To be acceptable to EPA, any settlement must also include substantial 
penalties that factor in the economic benefit that WES has enjoyed during its fengthy 
period of non-compliance, including both control equipment and operation and 
maintenance practices. The BEN and Project models should be run to determine this 
economic benefit, 
The settlement also must require W.E.S. to immediately come into and remain 
in compliance with the requirements of the 1996 Approval Order, with no variances 
allowed, Monthly or quarterly testing should be required, with appropriate stipulated 
penalties for exceadances. Compliance with the current permitted emission limits is 
critical for ensuring protection of human health and the environment, While the State 
has assured the public that the Davis County incinerator poses no risk, EPA does not 
believe that there is sufficient data to make such a conclusion, Attached for your 
consideration is EPA's regional toxicologist's evaluation of the "Characterization of Soil 
and Milk Samples from the Wasatch Energy Systems Facility Environs" report dated 
January 6, 1999. The report was required by the State's previous Consent Agreement 
with W.E.S. The evaluation memorandum, written by our regional toxicologist, 
Suzanne Wuerthele, Ph.D., points out some serious flaws in the report and outlines 
where additional information is needed in order to draw conclusions about the safety of 
human health and the environment surrounding the incinerator. We request a 
discussion with your office once this evaluation is reviewed by your staff. It is our belief 
that declarations that there is no risk cannot be made based on this report. 
A settlement between the State and W.E.S. must also include a firm schedule for 
installation and startup of the new controls with intermediate milestones and stipulated 
penalties for any missed milestones. In the interim, it is imperative that W.E.S, take 
steps to minimize dioxin/furan formation and emissions, including operating and 
maintaining the plant in a manner consistent with good air pollution control practices. 
Close monitoring of operational parameters and more frequent testing (monthly or 
quarterly) are needed. 
We realize that these issues need to be raised to State and EPA Senior 
Managers and possibly the Executives per the "Air Program Compliance /Enforcement 
Process from the FY2000 Performance Partnership Agreement". Our management is 
prepared to respond to any questions. However, if the State signs a settlement with 
W.E.S, that does not include each of the components discussed above, EPA will 
consider taking its own enforcement action pursuant to the provisions of the Utah/EPA 
Cooperative Enforcement Agreement. We hope to continue working cooperatively with 
the State in our joint goal of bringing W.E.S. into permanent compliance. If you have 
any questions or would like to discuss this matter, please feel free to contact me at 
(303) 312-6180. I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
Ron Rutherford 
Acting Director, Technical Enforcement 
Office of Enforcement, Compliance, and 
Environmental Justice 
Enclosure 
cc: Marvin Maxell, UT-DAQ 
Jeff Dean, UT-DAQ 
